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What Happened to the Great U.S. 
Job Machine? The Role of Trade 
and Electronic Offshoring
The loss of manufacturing jobs and hundreds of thousands of service jobs over
the past few years, and the threat of the loss of millions more to offshore out-
sourcing, is a clear call to our business and political leaders that our trade poli-
cies simply are not working. At the least, not in the national interest.1
THE BUSINESS CYCLE recovery of the past few years has been an unusual
one. In particular, payroll employment since the trough of the 2001 reces-
sion has been remarkably weak compared with previous recessions—a
point illustrated in ﬁgure 1.2 The decline in payroll employment from the
peak in March 2001 to the trough in November of the same year was mod-
est, but employment continued to fall for the next twenty-one months,
ending up just over a million jobs below the trough before starting to
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1. Lou Dobbs, “A Home Advantage for U.S. Corporations,” CNN Friday, August 27,
2004.
2. This now-familiar ﬁgure originated at the Council of Economic Advisers in the
1980s, where it was given considerable play “for obvious reasons,” as Michael Mussa has
remarked—job growth after the early 1980s recession was very strong indeed.  
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 211recover. This contrasts with most previous recessions, in which job
growth following the trough was strong. The aftermath of the previous
recession, that of 1990–91, was also characterized by relatively weak job
performance, as ﬁgure 1 also shows. But the jobs picture since 2001 has
been much weaker even than that “jobless recovery.”
In many press reports and in the minds of many Americans, much of
the weakness in the labor market is the fault of foreign competition. As
the quotation above indicates, there is uneasiness that manufacturing and
services sector jobs have been, or will be, moved abroad. Partly because
of technological change and partly because of trade agreements, so the
argument goes, U.S. workers now have to compete against a huge low-
wage global labor pool, and the sustained weakness in employment since
2000 is a sign that this competition is undermining the great U.S. job
machine.
Most economists dismiss these concerns as showing a misunder-
standing of how international trade works and of the ability of the U.S.
economy to reemploy workers displaced by trade. Indeed, most econ-
omists would argue that, over the long run, the United States will have to
212 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004












Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey Statistics, July 2004.
a. As identified by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 212reduce its trade deﬁcit, and that this could create more opportunities for
blue-collar workers in export industries. Similarly, the more services the
United States imports, the larger U.S. exports of both goods and other ser-
vices will eventually have to be to pay for them. But economists’ reassur-
ances on this point have not carried a lot of weight in the popular
debate—or even at times in the policy debate. 
Putting the role of trade in the U.S. economy in perspective is not sim-
ply a matter of setting the record straight. Misperceptions on the part of
workers may discourage them from acquiring the skills they need in order
to get good jobs. Misperceptions on the part of voters and elected ofﬁcials
can lead to bad policies. In this paper, therefore, we try to put trade and
electronic offshoring concerns in the right perspective, in a way that is
easily understandable. We estimate the size of the ﬁrst-round job disloca-
tion that trade and electronic offshoring may have caused between 2000
and 2003.3 The approach we use, and several assumptions we make along
the way, have the effect of exaggerating the impact on trade and off-
shoring on the U.S. labor market. Nevertheless, the results show that the
weakness in U.S. payroll employment since 2000 has not been caused by
a ﬂood of imports of either goods or services. It should certainly not be
attributed to any trade agreements the United States has signed.4 Rather,
the weakness of employment is primarily the result of inadequate growth
of domestic demand in the presence of strong productivity growth.
The paper also goes beyond this basic result in several ways and makes
the following additional ﬁndings: First, to the extent that trade did cause a
loss of manufacturing jobs, it was the weakness of U.S. exports after 2000
and not the strength of imports that was responsible—the share of imports
in the U.S. market actually declined. Second, the weakness in U.S.
exports was primarily the result of a strong dollar. The world market for
manufactured exports continued to grow after 2000, but the United States
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3. The use of the terms “offshoring” and “outsourcing” to refer to a wide variety of
(often overlapping) activities has created considerable confusion. In this paper we use 
the term “electronic offshoring” to refer to imports of electronically transmitted services.
For a discussion of these terms and one set of deﬁnitions, see Bhagwati, Panagariya, and 
Srinivasan (forthcoming).  
4. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in particular, has borne the
brunt of allegations that trade agreements are responsible for large job losses. Yet NAFTA
came into effect in 1995, and the subsequent ﬁve years saw very robust employment
growth. Hence whatever NAFTA’s employment effects may have been, it is simply im-
plausible to blame it for unemployment in 2001 and beyond.
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tor offshoring to India in 2000–03 was very small compared with the
aggregate changes in services sector employment during that period.
Fourth, focusing more narrowly on the U.S. technology sector, there has
been a loss of lower-paid programming jobs, much of which can be attrib-
uted to offshoring to India. But the employment picture for computer ser-
vices occupations as a whole has actually been surprisingly strong in the
last few years, especially if one allows for the unsustainable, domestic
demand-driven surge in employment in 2000. Fifth, trade is also unlikely
to be a major source of additional manufacturing jobs in the future: even
if the United States eliminates its merchandise trade deﬁcit over the next
decade, the net addition to manufacturing employment is likely to be
modest. Sixth and ﬁnally, although some have predicted that over 3 mil-
lion U.S. service jobs will be offshored via information technology
through 2015, and simulations from a macroeconomic model suggest that
offshoring of this magnitude will be large enough to have appreciable
effects on the macroeconomy, the nature of those effects depends cru-
cially on how that offshoring is modeled. If offshoring is modeled as a
decline in the price at which the United States can buy foreign services,
then U.S. GDP, real compensation of employees, and real proﬁts will all
be higher in 2015 as a result of services offshoring. If instead offshoring
is modeled simply as an increase in the quantity of services imports at
today’s prices, the welfare beneﬁts will be smaller because more exports
are needed to pay for these. Nonetheless, again, a relatively modest num-
ber of jobs are generated in manufacturing to produce these exports. All
told, our analysis suggests that trade is neither the major source of the cur-
rent troubles facing U.S. manufacturing workers nor a potential solution
to their problems in the future. 
The Pattern of Employment Change
This section uses detailed data broken down by industry and occupa-
tion to review which sectors of the economy have lost jobs in recent years
and which types of workers lost them. We ﬁnd that the job losses were
overwhelmingly concentrated in the manufacturing sector, and that major
services industries that had been consistent job creators over the 1990s
stopped creating jobs after 2000, and indeed lost signiﬁcant numbers of
214 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
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job-creating capabilities of private sector service industries played into
popular fears that trade and offshoring are driving the outcome.
Job Changes by Major Sector
Our ability to make consistent comparisons across industries over time
is limited because of the changeover from the Standard Industrial Classi-
ﬁcation (SIC) to the North American Industry Classiﬁcation System
(NAICS) in 1997. A recent major revision to the occupational classiﬁca-
tions makes comparisons across occupations similarly problematic. Nev-
ertheless, the patterns in the available data are striking. Figure 2 shows
annual average employment changes by broad industry grouping (based
on NAICS deﬁnitions) from 1990 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2003, calcu-
lated from payroll data from establishments. Private sector employment
declined after 2000 at a rate of 880,000 a year, or 2.64 million in total.
Government employment meanwhile rose by more than 200,000 a year,
so that the total decline in payroll employment for the three years was
1.86 million. Employment in the manufacturing sector was very hard hit
indeed, declining at a rate of over 900,000 a year, for a total of 2.8 million
jobs lost over the three years, more than the decline in total private sector
employment. The sectors with the largest employment gains after 2000
were health and education (more the former than the latter) and the 
government sector (which includes employment in public educational
institutions).
The other large sources of the post-2000 decline by industry were pro-
fessional and business services and wholesale and retail trade, where
employment fell at rates of 223,000 and 232,000 jobs a year, respectively.
These two sectors’ contribution to the overall swing in labor market con-
ditions is even greater than their post-2000 job losses indicate. Unlike
manufacturing, both sectors were large contributors to the job gains of the
1990s, and they then ﬂipped to large losses after 2000. If one compares
the size of the swings in employment performance before and after 2000,
manufacturing remains the largest contributor to the shift in the employ-
ment picture, but professional and business services is close behind, and
the contribution of wholesale and retail trade is large also. The informa-
tion sector likewise went from being a solid employment creator in the
1990s to an employment loser after 2000. Besides data processing ser-
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industries that are less about information technology (IT) than about
information itself (media and publishing companies, for example).
In summary, the shift in employment performance after 2000 was
widespread across the major nongovernment sectors of the economy, as is
to be expected in a general business cycle downturn. However, much of
216 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
Figure 2. Employment Gains and Losses by Sector, 1990–2000 and 2000–03a























Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey Statistics, July 2004.
a. Sectors are NAICS “Super Sectors.” Data are annual averages.
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 216the action was in the three large sectors of manufacturing, professional
and business services, and wholesale and retail trade. Manufacturing is
notable for the very large job losses it suffered, and the other two are
notable because they went from being big job gainers to job losers.5
Job Changes by Occupation
The Bureau of Labor Statistics conducts an establishment survey that
reports employment by occupation by industry (the Occupational
Employment Statistics, or OES data). These data are not in the form of
annual averages, because in November 2002 the survey frequency was
shifted from once a year to twice a year. Because of classiﬁcation changes,
consistent data are available only since 1999. Figure 3 shows the break-
down of the total job decline from the fourth quarter of 2000 to the second
quarter of 2003. The total job loss in this survey is comparable to,
although a bit smaller than, the job loss in the regular establishment sur-
vey. Figure 3 also shows the mean annual wage of each group.
By far the largest employment decline by occupation occurred among
production workers. Given what happened in the manufacturing sector,
this is not a great surprise. About three-quarters of the decline in produc-
tion occupations occurred among workers employed in the manufacturing
sector. Private sector services saw a decline of 437,000 production work-
ers, notably in the areas of administrative support and waste management,
professional and technical services, and wholesale trade. The data provide
much detail within the category of production workers, but no obvious
pattern emerges—declines occurred more or less across the board. The
largest job decline was in team assemblers, followed by electrical and
electronic equipment assemblers.
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5. One important qualiﬁcation is necessary. Within the professional and business ser-
vices sector, the two industries that had the largest employment gains before 2000 and the
largest employment losses after 2000 were the employment services industry and the com-
puter systems design and related services industry. Both of these subindustries provide
intermediate services for other industries across the economy. We examine the computer
services sector later in the paper. The biggest mover in the employment services industry
is temporary help services, which provides employees to a range of other industries. This
subindustry alone accounted for about a quarter of the job gains in the professional and
business services sector before 2000 and about 58 percent of the job losses after. Thus the
employment weakness was not quite as concentrated in three big sectors as appears from
the industry employment data. Job losses in other industries were attributed back to the
business services sector as temporary employees were released.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 218Somewhat surprisingly, the occupational category that suffered the
second-largest number of job losses was managers—the highest-paid cat-
egory. The biggest losses occurred for general and operational managers,
chief executives, ﬁnancial managers, administrative services managers,
and human resource managers. Few subcategories showed gains, and
those that did were mostly education and social services managers and
legislators. The breakdown of managerial job losses by industry shows
that the largest losses occurred in private services (713,000 jobs lost at
mean annual earnings of $174,000 in 2003), followed by manufacturing
(334,000 at $92,000).
The employment declines in the two broad occupational categories of
managers and production workers more than account for the total job loss
in the establishment data.6 When the downturn hit, it seems that com-
panies got rid of many of their production workers and managers. This is
consistent with ﬁrms deciding to shut down whole operations and lines of
business that were no longer proﬁtable once the boom ended.7
To summarize this section, the manufacturing sector is extensively
involved in international trade. It is therefore not surprising that many
observers have found it plausible to assign imports a major role in the loss
of production jobs between 2000 and 2003. Traditionally, business ser-
vices activities have been overwhelmingly driven by domestic economic
activity and seen as much less susceptible to cyclical ﬂuctuations. But the
change in the fortunes of well-paid workers in this sector during this
period may have created an environment of uncertainty in which new
trends could be seen as having highly ominous implications. 
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6. The total job loss in the OES occupational data is slightly smaller than that over the
same period from the payroll data. The OES sample is from a separate survey with fewer
respondents.
7. There is a signiﬁcant discrepancy between the occupational decomposition from the
OES and that from the Current Population Survey (CPS) data. The sharp decline in employ-
ment of managers that is evident in the OES establishment data does not appear in the CPS
data; in fact, the CPS data show a modest increase in employment in this occupational cat-
egory from 2000 to 2003. The number of managers in the CPS is nearly twice that in the
OES data, in part because the self-employed and small farmers often describe themselves
as managers. Signiﬁcant “grade inﬂation” also appears elsewhere in the CPS data: experi-
enced sales clerks are often described as assistant managers, for example. The drop in pro-
duction worker employment, however, shows up strongly in both data sources. The CPS
also shows a signiﬁcant decline in administrative and ofﬁce support jobs, which is much
less pronounced in the OES data.
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 2198. Liz Austin (Associated Press), “Commerce Secretary Announces New Position of
Assistant Secretary for Manufacturing,” Detroit News, September 3, 2003. 
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The Impact of Trade on the Manufacturing Sector
The recession has bludgeoned the nation’s factories in the past three years, with
a record 36 consecutive months of job losses totaling 2.7 million. Low demand
at home and abroad, coupled with a ﬂood of imports, have slowed production.8
In this section we use input-output tables of the U.S. economy to esti-
mate the direct impact of trade on employment in U.S. manufacturing
between 2000 and 2003. First, however, we place the recent employment
performance in historical perspective, explain why the manufacturing
trade deﬁcit has been viewed as an important causal factor in the employ-
ment decline, and use GDP data to show that the performance of exports—
not imports—is the more important part of the recent employment story. 
The manufacturing share of U.S. employment has been declining for at
least half a century. This is not unique to the United States, however; it is
typical of developed economies and even characteristic of many develop-
ing economies. The basic reason is that although demand for the output of
the manufacturing sector has grown about as rapidly as GDP, it has not






1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey Statistics.
a. As defined in NAICS,  seasonally adjusted.
Millions of workers
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grown fast enough to offset the relatively rapid productivity growth in the
sector.9 As a result, the relative demand for manufacturing workers has
declined.10
Some observers explain the recent job loss in manufacturing by point-
ing to the relatively rapid manufacturing productivity growth of recent
years, but between 2000 and 2003 this factor did not play a dominant role.
Over that period the share of manufacturing in nonfarm payrolls fell from
13.1 percent to 11.1 percent—a drop of 15 percent. But the 12 percent in-
crease in nonfarm output per worker-hour between 2000 and 2003 was
only 3 percentage points less than the increase in manufacturing labor
productivity. This leaves 80 percent (12 percentage points of the 15 percent)
of the decline in manufacturing’s employment share to be explained by
other factors.11
Moreover, the concerns were more about absolute job loss than about
manufacturing’s declining share. As ﬁgure 4 illustrates, in the decade of
the 1990s, the absolute level of employment in manufacturing remained
fairly stable. In fact, between 1993 and 1998 manufacturing payrolls
increased from 16.8 million to 17.6 million, almost regaining their 1989
peak of 18 million. They then declined modestly to 17.3 million by 2000.
Thereafter, however, manufacturing employment fell precipitously.
Between 2000 and 2003 payroll employment in manufacturing fell 
16.2 percent—the largest slump in manufacturing employment in postwar
history.12
Table 1 ranks major industries (as identiﬁed by three-digit NAICS cat-
egories) by the size of their employment declines between 2000 and 2003.
Although the job losses were concentrated among producers of capital
9. The demand for manufactured output depends on both the income and price elas-
ticities. Rapid productivity growth could, of course, be associated with an increasing
employment share in the sector if the demand for manufactured goods were sufﬁciently
elastic, but it is not. See Economic Report of the President, 2004, for a discussion. 
10. The declining share of employment in manufacturing has not been consistently
associated with a declining share of manufacturing output in GDP. Measured in chained
1996 dollars, the share of manufacturing output in overall GDP did decline from 17.3 per-
cent in 2000 to 16.1 percent in 2002. But this occurred after manufacturing’s share had
risen from 15.8 percent of GDP in 1992 to peak at 17.6 percent in 1998.
11. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates, output per hour in the nonfarm
business sector and in manufacturing increased by 11.7 percent and 14.8 percent, respec-
tively, between 2000 and 2003. 
12. The largest previous decline was from 19.4 million to 16.7 million between 1979
and 1983.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 222goods and apparel, every three-digit industry saw its payrolls fall. The
bursting of the high-technology bubble resulted in the loss of more than
half a million jobs in the industry that produces computers and electronic
products—fully 28.5 percent of the industry’s 2000 employment. Other
large declines occurred in machinery (312,000 jobs lost, or 21.5 percent)
and fabricated metal products (290,000, or 16.5 percent). Apparel and
leather (195,000 jobs lost, or 36.3 percent) and textile product mills
(166,200, or 28.6 percent) were severely affected. Table 1 also shows the
change in value added by industry and in value added per employee—
important drivers of employment change whose role will be featured in
the later analysis.
To many observers, trade was the obvious culprit for these job losses.
The United States has run increasing deﬁcits in manufacturing trade since
1992. These deﬁcits have been both large relative to the size of the sector
and growing. The growth in the deﬁcit has been particularly pronounced
since 1997, when U.S. exports stagnated in the aftermath of the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis while U.S. imports increased rapidly as the economy
boomed. As a result, between 1997 and 2000 the trade deﬁcit in manufac-
tured goods more than doubled, from $136 billion to $317 billion. As
table 2 indicates, between 2000 and 2003 the trade balance in manufac-
turing declined by an additional $86.1 billion, predominantly because
exports fell by $62.3 billion (8.8 percent), although imports also in-
creased, by $23.6 billion (2.3 percent). 
Table 1 illustrates that declining trade balances were widespread
across industries between 2000 and 2003. Only one of the nineteen in-
dustries in manufacturing—primary metals—avoided a decline in its
trade balance over the period. The sectors with the largest declines were
chemical products ($15.3 billion), machinery ($13.0 billion), computers 
($8.1 billion), apparel ($8.0 billion), and food ($7.5 billion). Export per-
formance was particularly weak: exports fell in ﬁfteen of the nineteen
industries. The largest percentage declines were in apparel (down $3 bil-
lion, or 27.2 percent), computers ($46 billion, or 23.6 percent), and motor
vehicles ($8 billion, or 20.1 percent). Other large declines were in ma-
chinery (down $15 billion) and other transportation (which includes air-
craft; down $6.5 billion).
How do these deﬁcits compare with overall manufacturing output?
Figure 5 shows the manufacturing trade deﬁcit as a percentage of manu-
facturing output, with output measured in two different ways. The ﬁrst
Martin Neil Baily and Robert Z. Lawrence 223
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 223measure is value added in the industry—the contribution to GDP that
originates in the sector. On this basis the manufacturing trade deﬁcit was
equal to 28.3 percent of manufacturing output in 2003, up from 21.3 per-
cent in 2000. The second measure is the gross output of the sector—how
much manufacturing sells outside the sector, whether to U.S. buyers or
overseas.13 Calculated on this basis, the trade deﬁcit is not as large a fac-
tor in the overall manufacturing picture: it equaled 15.6 percent of gross
output in 2003, up from 11.9 percent in 2000.
Although these comparisons give somewhat different results, the size
of the deﬁcit and its pervasiveness across sectors make it easy for Ameri-
224 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
13. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates this ﬁgure by adding up the
output of all manufacturing establishments and then estimating what fraction of that output
consists of sales to other parts of the same sector. These intrasector sales are then netted
out, and the remainder is the gross output of the sector.
Table 2. Selected Indicators of the Macroeconomy and Manufacturing, 2000–03
Change, Change, 2000–03
Indicator 2000 2003 2000–03 (percent)
Output (billions of dollars)
GDP 9,817.0 10,987.9 1,170.9 11.9
Manufacturing 1,426.2 1,392.8 –33.4 –2.3
Employment (millions of workers)
Nonfarm business sector 131.8 129.9 –1.9 –1.4
Manufacturing 17.3 14.5 –2.8 –16.2
Manufacturing productivity
Output per hour (index, 1992 = 100) 134.2 154.6 20.4 15.2
Merchandise trade 
(billions of dollars)
Exports 784.3 726.4 –57.9 –7.4
Imports 1,243.5 1,282.0 38.5 3.1
Balance –459.2 –555.6 –96.4 21.0
Manufacturing trade 
(billions of dollars)
Exports 707.2 644.9 –62.3 –8.8
Imports 1,024.4 1,048 23.6 2.3
Balance –317.0 –403.1 –86.1 27.2
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, June 17, 2004,
revision; U.S. International Trade Commission.
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 224cans to believe that trade played a major role in the manufacturing reces-
sion. In particular, as the quotation above suggests, many saw imports as
the principal culprit. But do the data support this view?
We focus on imports ﬁrst. Changes in domestic spending will generally
be reﬂected in changes in imports, and thus imports tend to act as a stabi-
lizer for domestic employment. When domestic spending falls or grows
slowly, for example, some of the impact will occur abroad. Fewer U.S.
jobs will therefore be lost than if the economy were self-contained. Con-
versely, in the presence of imports, fewer domestic jobs will be created when
domestic demand is growing rapidly. Thus one benchmark in assessing the
Martin Neil Baily and Robert Z. Lawrence 225
Figure 5. Manufacturing Trade Deﬁcit as a Fraction of Manufacturing Value Added






1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Percent
Value added (GDP in sector)
Gross outputa
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations
a. Adjusted to remove intramanufacturing transactions.
Deﬁcit as a fraction of:
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 225impact of imports is whether or not they are rising faster than domestic
spending. In general, if imports were a major independent cause of job
loss, one might expect to see them outpacing domestic spending; if they
were simply responding to shifts in domestic spending, they would rise at
the same pace; and if they were acting to stabilize employment where
spending was weak, they would rise more slowly than spending.
Table 3 provides some perspective on the role of goods in U.S. GDP. It
is important to note that these data measure ﬁnal sales of goods. In addi-
tion to manufacturing value added, therefore, they include distribution
margins and primary commodity inputs, issues we will deal with later.
Nonetheless, they provide important insights into this question. Between
2000 and 2003, measured in 2000 chain-weighted dollars, the volume of
merchandise imports grew by 5.1 percent, a pace that was actually slower
than U.S. domestic spending on goods for domestic use (consumption,
investment, and government spending), which increased by 6.6 percent.
In 2000 dollars, therefore, the share of imports in U.S. domestic spending
on goods actually fell from 31.8 percent to 31.4 percent. (In current dol-
lars there was a slightly larger decline in the import share.) 
The export story is different. Here one benchmark is the share of
exports in domestic goods output. Between 2000 and 2003, goods output
increased by 3.8 percent, but the volume of merchandise exports actually
declined by 8.0 percent. This led to a decline in the share of goods exports
in goods output from 23 percent to 20 percent. Together with the import
data, these data suggest that falling exports detracted from employment,
and not that a rising share of imports led to disproportionate unemployment.
Although highly suggestive, measures such as these may fail to accu-
rately indicate the size of the trade effects on the manufacturing sector,
because they include value added in other sectors.14 Trade ﬂows operate on
the demand for labor in manufacturing in complex ways. First, manufac-
tured exports are not produced entirely within the manufacturing sector:
manufactured goods also embody value added from other sectors, such as
services and primary commodities. Second, and conversely, trade in non-
manufactured goods and services will embody manufactured goods. And
third, many goods produced in the United States contain imported compo-
nents. Ignoring this could lead to an overstatement of U.S. employment
226 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
14. On the one hand, the ratio of the trade balance to value added will overstate the
contribution of trade to manufacturing, because the components in the numerator, which
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 226due to exports. Similarly, displacement due to imports could be overstated,
because imports may displace domestic products that themselves contain
imported intermediates. In the analysis that follows, we try to account for
these effects by linking trade ﬂows with domestic production using input-
output tables and by making adjustments to reﬂect imported components. 
The Basic Relationship between Trade and Employment
We start by clarifying some basic relationships and concepts. In this
analysis we are interested in the relative importance of trade and domestic
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are measures of the value of manufactured trade, will also include value contained in these
products from other sectors (primary commodity inputs and services). On the other hand,
the ratio of the trade balance to gross output could understate the impact, to the degree that
the denominator includes the value of nonmanufactured goods inputs. 
Table 3. Output and Absorption of Goods in the National Income Accounts, 2000–04
Change,
2000-03
Item 2000 2003 2004 (percent)
In billions of chain-weighted 2000 dollars
GDP 9,817.0 10,381.3 10,697.5 5.7
Total output of goods 3,449.3 3,581.8 3,784.8 3.8
Merchandise imports 1,243.5 1,307.3 1,394.1 5.1
Merchandise exports 784.3 721.7 767.2 –8.0
Domestic use of goodsa 3,908.5 4,167.4 4,411.7 6.6
Imports as share of domestic goods market 
(percent)b 31.8 31.4 31.6 –1.4
Exports as share of domestic production 
(percent)c 22.7 20.1 20.3 –11.4
In billions of current dollars
GDP 9,817.0 11,004.0 11,557.9 12.1
Total output of goods 3,449.3 3,564.5 3,779.4 3.3
Merchandise imports 1,243.5 1,282.0 1,435.7 3.1
Merchandise exports 784.3 726.4 800.4 –7.4
Domestic use of goods 3,908.5 4,120.1 4,414.7 5.4
Imports as share of domestic goods market 
(percent) 31.8 31.1 32.5 –2.2
Exports as share of domestic production 
(percent) 22.7 20.4 21.2 –10.4
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, August 27, 2004, revision.
a. Total goods output plus merchandise imports, minus merchandise exports, which is equal to the sum of consumption,
investment, and government use.
b. Merchandise imports divided by goods for domestic use.
c. Merchandise exports divided by total output of goods.
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2003. But, in addition to these demand-side variables, manufacturing pro-
ductivity growth plays a major role. We can decompose changes in
employment into three elements: changes due to changes in productivity,
changes due to changes in trade (exports and imports), and changes due to
changes in domestic use. Taking productivity as given, we can then
ascribe employment changes to trade and domestic use.
Start from the identity:
where V is value added per worker, Q is output, E is employment, and i
indexes industries. With lowercase letters indicating percentage changes,
this gives (approximately)
A second key identity links domestic production to trade and domestic
use. We know that in an open economy Y = C + I + G + X – M. Deﬁning
domestic use D as C + I + G, we get the identity Y = D + X – M. For each
industry, therefore, 
Note that, in this formulation, when we say that output in an industry is
“due to” domestic use and trade, we do not mean that it is due only to
domestic use of and trade in the products made by that industry. For
example, when an automobile is exported from the United States, it will
embody inputs such as steel, aluminum, computers, and so forth that have
been produced in other industries. The impact of exports from one indus-
try on production in all other industries must therefore be correctly attrib-
uted. Similarly, when an import replaces a domestic product, it reduces
demand not only in the industry in which the product is made but also in
the sectors that produce inputs for that product. A complete accounting of
the role of trade and domestic demand should incorporate these indirect
effects. 
Equation 3 implies that 
() – . 4 qw dw xw m i d ix im i =+
() – . 3 QDXM iiii =+
() . 2 eqv ii i =−
() / , 1 VQ E ii i =
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weighted rates of change in value added due to domestic use and due to
exports minus the weighted rate of change of value added due to imports.
The weights reﬂect base-year (year zero) shares; that is, wd = D0/Q0,w x =
X0/Q0, and wm = M0/Q0. Substituting equation 4 into equation 2, and using
the fact that wd + wx – wm = 1, gives
In words, the percentage change in employment is equal to the
weighted average of the percentage changes in the differences between
the growth rate of labor productivity and value added due to domestic use,
value added due to exports, and value added attributable to imports. This
expression indicates, for example, that for employment due to exports to
remain unchanged, the growth rate in value added due to exports (xi) must
be equal to the growth rate in labor productivity (vi). If value added due to
exports increases more slowly than productivity growth, exports will con-
tribute negatively to employment. A similar relation holds for domestic
demand, whose growth rate must exceed that of productivity if domestic
demand is to contribute positively to employment.
Since imports enter negatively into equation 5, the opposite condition
holds for imports. If the value added attributable to imports increases less
rapidly than productivity growth, this will contribute positively to domes-
tic employment. Imports are assumed to displace employment in domes-
tic import-competing industries. However, productivity is continually
rising in these industries, which means that, for a given level of imports,
the number of jobs displaced goes down over time. It would take pro-
gressively fewer and fewer U.S. workers to make a given quantity of
manufactured goods being imported. Only if imports rise faster than pro-
ductivity will the number of U.S. jobs being displaced by imports rise
over time.
We emphasize that equation 5 is an ex post identity and that the ele-
ments in equation 5 are all endogenous variables. Decomposing employ-
ment changes using this identity provides an ex post accounting of the
relative importance of these variables in shifting employment; it does not
explain what has caused these variables to change. Productivity, trade
flows, and domestic demand are interrelated in complex ways. Their move-
ments may reﬂect independent causes or interactions among them. For
() –– – – . 5 ew dv w xv w mv i d ii x ii m ii = () + () ( )
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U.S. prices, more U.S. exports, fewer imports, and more domestic use.
However, rapid U.S. productivity growth could also lead to higher U.S.
incomes and more demand for both domestic products and imports. Simi-
larly, rapid increases in imports could stimulate domestic productivity
growth, and increases in domestic demand could lead to more imports and
fewer exports. 
In addition, it is dangerous to imply that increased imports and larger
trade deﬁcits necessarily come at the expense of domestic employment.
The clearest way to see this is to imagine that the economy is at full
employment, as it was in 2000. In that case it is not possible for domestic
supply to meet a further increase in demand. The ability to trade allows
national spending to exceed national income, and so the increase in
national spending leads to a larger trade deﬁcit, but there is no job loss
due to imports. Yet a mechanical decomposition might lead to the claim
of jobs lost due to imports.
In sum, these estimates can be helpful in providing a perspective on the
relative importance of domestic demand and trade in manufacturing
employment. But it is important to be cautious in drawing causal implica-
tions from these results. 
Our Approach
It is relatively straightforward to obtain measures of employment and
labor productivity (ei and vi in equation 5). The real work comes in esti-
mating the changes due to exports (xi) and imports (mi). Once these are
obtained, changes due to domestic use (di) can be derived as a residual. In
this study we estimate these effects due to trade using the summary U.S.
input-output tables for 1997, the most recent year for which data are
available at a sufﬁciently disaggregated level. The total-requirements ver-
sion of this table is structured as a matrix, with over 130 industries listed
by row and over 130 commodities by column. The values in the table are
coefﬁcients reporting the gross output required from the indicated indus-
try to produce one dollar of the indicated commodity for ﬁnal use. The
coefﬁcients reﬂect both direct and indirect requirements. For example,
producing an automobile requires a host of inputs—these are the direct
requirements. But to produce these inputs, another set of inputs is
required, and yet another set to produce these inputs, and so on—these are
230 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
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these effects.
As an example, for each dollar of final delivery of motor vehicles, the
largest total requirement is output of 99.8 cents by the motor vehicle
manufacturing industry. In addition, 53.3 cents of output is required
from the industry titled “motor vehicle body, trailer and parts manufac-
turing,” 13.1 cents from wholesale trade, 6.9 cents from electrical equip-
ment manufacturing, 5.7 cents from plastics, and so on. All told, 288.8
cents are required from the economy as a whole to produce a dollar’s
worth of motor vehicles delivered to final demand. (This figure exceeds
one dollar because it captures the value of all components along the
value chain as well as final output.) To obtain our estimates, we go
through five calculations.
value added. First, since we are interested in estimating value added
by industry, we multiply each of the matrix coefﬁcients by the 1997 ratio
of value added to gross output for each industry. This provides us with
estimates of the direct and indirect value added required from each indus-
try to produce a dollar of ﬁnal demand. For motor vehicles, for example,
the ratio of value added to output was 0.156. Thus the 99.8 cents’ worth of
ﬁnal demand for motor vehicles was associated with 15.6 cents of value
added in motor vehicles.15
aggregation. To make our work tractable and intelligible, we then
aggregate these value-added coefﬁcients to provide estimates at the three-
digit NAICS level, which, for example, divides manufacturing into
nineteen industries. We aggregate the commodities by weighting the co-
efﬁcients in the columns comprising parts of the three-digit sector by the
share of each commodity in the total commodity output of that sector.16
We then sum the coefﬁcients in the rows that make up each three-digit
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15. Let IO = total requirements table and IOv = total value added requirements table.
v = vector of the ratio of value added to gross output by industry (from the 1997
input-output use table) 
go = vector of gross output (from the 1997 input-output use table):
(1) v = va/go
(2) IOv = v * IO
16. If Cij are the coefficients of the matrix IO, we need to obtain new coefficients Cik,
for a matrix IO3d with three-digit industry requirements. We first collapse the number of
columns using growth outputs in the industry subsectors as weights. We obtain Cik =
(ci1*go1 + ci2*go2 + ...+ ciJ*goJ)/(go1 + go2 + ...+ goJ), with j = 1, 2, ...   , J and go1 + go2
+ ...+ goJ = gok. Then we aggregate these Cik for all is in each three-digit industry.
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 231industry. This results in a matrix that estimates direct and indirect value
added at the three-digit level. 
value added due to trade. Under the assumption that the intersec-
toral relationships between 2000 and 2003 are the same as those of 1997,
we then use three-digit NAICS trade data to estimate the value added in
each three-digit manufacturing industry that is embodied in merchandise
trade in 2000, 2002, and 2003. We obtain separate estimates for exports
and imports.17
correcting for imported components. These value-added compo-
nents are upper-bound estimates of the effects due to exports and imports,
because the requirements table is derived under the assumption that all
inputs are produced domestically. To account for imported components
used as intermediate inputs, we adjust the requirements by assuming that
imported inputs are purchased in proportion to their share in the domestic
market, where the domestic market is deﬁned for each industry as the sum
of gross output and imports.18 (We will also report our aggregate results
without making this correction.)
employment.  The final step involves estimating the employment
content of value added. We assume that productivity in each U.S. indus-
try is the same whether the production is for export, to replace imports,
or to serve other domestic demand. This implies that the relative alloca-
tions of employment to exports, import substitution, and domestic use,
within each industry, are the same as the relative allocations of value
added.
Data on value added per employee for manufacturing industries are
available for 2000 and 2002. To correspond to the trade data, which are in
current dollars, we use current-dollar value added per employee. Neither
real nor nominal value added per employee is available by industry for
2003, and so we estimate the 2003 ﬁgure by multiplying the 2002 data by
the growth in the industry-level industrial production index and the indus-
try producer price index between 2002 and 2003. Dividing industry value
added due to exports and imports by value added per worker provides us
with estimates of industry employment “due to” exports and imports.
232 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
17. X * IO3d = vaX (total value added of exports)
M * IO3d = vaM (total value added of imports).
18. adjvaX = vaX * {1 – [m/(go + m)]} (total value added of exports adjusting by
imported inputs) and adjvaM = vaM * [m/(go + m)] (total value added of imports adjusting
by imported inputs).
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 232Finally, we estimate employment due to domestic use as a residual—the
difference between actual employment and employment due to trade.
In addition to the caveats given earlier, we note that input-output co-
efﬁcients allow for no substitution possibilities among inputs and no changes
in input requirements over time. Furthermore, among products, the analy-
sis assumes that ﬁnal demands always substitute between particular
imports and the output of the domestic industry that manufactures prod-
ucts similar to those imports, rather than between particular imports and
products of some other industry.
Results 
Trade plays an important role in manufacturing employment. In 2000
production for export accounted for 3.43 million manufacturing jobs, or
20 percent of manufacturing employment. Each dollar of exports was
associated with 48 cents of manufacturing value added, with the rest com-
ing from imported inputs and other domestic sectors. Each million dollars
in exports, therefore, required 5.2 jobs in manufacturing. On average,
these jobs were associated with high levels of labor productivity. Output
per employee engaged in export production was $91,700, considerably
higher than either the $80,700 in manufacturing as a whole or the $84,600
for domestic production that replaces imports. 
Between 2000 and 2003, productivity growth in manufacturing was
remarkably rapid. Our estimated measure of nominal value added per
employee increased by 15.3 percent over the three years, just about the
same as the ofﬁcial measure of (real) output per worker-hour in manufac-
turing estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We estimate that pro-
duction for export accounted for 3.43 million jobs in 2000. In 2000 value
added per employee in U.S. manufacturing was $80,700. We estimate that
by 2003 this had increased to $93,100. Had demand remained constant,
manufacturing employment would have fallen by 2.64 million—only
slightly less than the actual total loss of 2.74 million jobs between 2000
and 2003. Thus one way to interpret the data is to say that the decline is
entirely “due to” domestic productivity growth. Taking output as given, in
other words, productivity improvements caused all the job loss. 
However, an alternative approach is to see how domestic use and trade
contributed to the decline, taking productivity growth as given—an analy-
sis we are now in a position to undertake. As equation 5 indicates, given
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have remained constant would have been for value added due to domestic
demand, exports, and imports to rise by 15.3 percent each. Instead value
added due to domestic demand and imports increased by just 0.3 percent
and 2.4 percent, respectively, while value added due to exports actually
fell by 11.1 percent. The result was the precipitous 15.9 percent slump in
employment.
Our estimates point to the failure of domestic demand growth to match
productivity growth as the major source of the decline. We attribute 
88 percent of the drop, or some 2.5 million jobs, to the slow growth in
domestic demand (table 4); we attribute only 12 percent, or some 314,000
jobs, to trade. Although the employment decline attributable to exports
played a major role, accounting for 28 percent of the drop, or 742,000
jobs, imports actually offset this fall by 429,000 jobs and thus had a posi-
tive effect as judged by this baseline. This positive effect arises partly
because of rapid productivity growth and partly because of the slow
growth of imports, the manufacturing job content of U.S. imports (which
have a negative impact on employment) was actually 8.8 percent lower
than in 2000.19
Imports mitigated the job loss in manufacturing over 2000–03, but not
because of an exogenous downward shock to imports. There is no evi-
dence that the United States was suddenly able to compete more effec-
tively against foreign producers. The slow growth of imports was due to
the slow growth in overall U.S. demand, which affected both domestic
suppliers of manufactured goods and foreign suppliers. 
In the above estimates we have adjusted the input-output coefﬁcients
to take account of imported inputs. This has the effect of reducing the esti-
mated impact of trade ﬂows by reducing the domestic value added due to
exports and that due to imports. When we do not make these adjustments,
therefore, we get somewhat larger effects due to trade and thus smaller
effects due to domestic demand, but qualitatively the results are the same.
Using this approach, the net impact of trade on manufacturing job loss
rises from 314,000 to 341,000.20
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19. Between 2000 and 2003, value added per employee due to exports and imports
increased by 13.7 percent and 12.3 percent, respectively, both somewhat less than the
increase in value added in manufacturing as a whole.
20. Without the import correction, between 2000 and 2003, 951,000 jobs are lost
because of lower exports and 611,000 jobs are gained because of lower imports.
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second and third columns again document the very large shrinkage in
manufacturing employment over this period, with the largest percentage
declines experienced by apparel (36.3 percent), textiles (28.6 percent),
computers and electronic products (28.5 percent), primary metals (24.0
percent), and electrical equipment (23.2 percent). In all of these industries
domestic use was, by a large measure, the major source of the loss, rang-
ing from 112 percent in the case of apparel (where, surprisingly, trade
actually had a positive impact) to 87 percent of the decline in electrical
equipment. The effects of sluggish domestic demand (and rapid produc-
tivity growth) were devastating for the apparel sector. Together these
induced a jobs decline equal to 40.6 percent of 2000 employment. Large
declines were also experienced by computers and electronic products
(28.7 percent), textiles (24.2 percent), primary metals (23.4 percent), and
electrical equipment (20.2 percent). 
By contrast, the net job losses due to trade in most industries were rel-
atively small. The noteworthy exceptions were chemical products and
plastics, in which the losses due to trade were 17.1 percent and 10.9 percent
of 2000 employment, respectively. In all other sectors, net losses due 
to trade were less than 4.5 percent of 2000 employment. In both chemi-
cals and plastics the dominant source of the declines was exports. Losses 
due to reduced exports in chemicals and plastics equaled 15.9 percent 
and 10.5 percent of 2000 employment, respectively. Employment due to
exports also subtracted from employment in computer products (down
14.8 percent) and primary metals (8.2 percent), but imports actually helped
stabilize employment in computers (15.0 percent), apparel (7.9 percent),
and primary metals (7.6 percent). 
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Table 4. Sources of Change in Manufacturing Employment, 2000–03
Millions of workers
Year Total Exports Imports Tradea Domestic useb
2000 17.175 3.434 –4.944 –1.510 18.685
2002 14.899 2.739 –4.372 –1.633 16.532
2003 14.324 2.691 –4.515 –1.824 16.148
Change, 2000–03 –2.851 –0.742 0.429 –0.314 –2.537
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Survey; Bureau of Economic Analysis, Input-Output Tables;
authors’ calculations.
a. Difference between previous two columns. 
b. Number of U.S. workers who would have been employed if all imports had been replaced by domestic production.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 236The ﬁnal two columns of table 5 present our estimates for each indus-
try of the share of employment that depends on exports. In 2000, for man-
ufacturing as a whole, this share was 22.4 percent—almost a quarter of all
jobs. Strikingly, the industry with the greatest dependence was primary
metals (ferrous and nonferrous): 49.2 percent of all jobs in this industry
depended on exports in 2000. This is undoubtedly a surprise to those in
industries such as steel who focus on the direct impact of imports and
ignore the powerful indirect effects that stem from their own dependence
on U.S. exports from metals-using sectors. Indeed, the primary metals
industry has become even more dependent on exports, with this share ris-
ing to 54 percent in 2003. Moreover, as table 5 also indicates, the negative
inﬂuence on employment in primary metals during 2000–03 came from
the behavior of exports, not imports. Other sectors with a strong depen-
dence on exports in 2000 were computers (where exports supported 41.3
percent of employment), chemical products (41.3 percent), machinery
(30.0 percent), and other transportation (which includes aircraft; 29.6 per-
cent). Another interesting result is that export-related employment in tex-
tiles increased from 24.4 percent to 30.1 percent from 2000 to 2003.
Over all, the results of this analysis are certainly at odds with the wide-
spread perception that the bulk of job loss in U.S. manufacturing is attrib-
utable to a rapid increase in outsourcing. Instead they suggest that the
behavior of imports has been, if anything, a stabilizing factor and that the
weakness due to trade is attributable to the behavior of exports. Accord-
ingly, we turn now to consider what might explain export behavior. 
Understanding the Weakness in U.S. Exports
Lackluster demand for U.S. exports has been another source of weakness in the
manufacturing sector over the past three years. Exports have been depressed, in
part due to slow growth in other major economies. Since the fourth quarter of
2000, the average annual rates of real GDP growth in the euro area and Japan
have been less than half that of the United States. Industrial supplies and capi-
tal goods make up the bulk of U.S. goods exports.21
The previous section concluded that, on net, trade was not a major
cause of the loss of manufacturing jobs but that the weakness in exports,
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21. Economic Report of the President, 2004, p. 55.
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ask why U.S. exports were weak.
As the quotation just above indicates, one obvious explanation for the
decline in U.S. manufactured exports over 2000–03 is the world growth
recession, and the outright recession in major U.S. markets such as conti-
nental Europe, that occurred after 2000. If the slowdown in the global
economy was matched by a slowdown in global trade, then U.S. exports
would have weakened even if the United States had been able to maintain
its share of world trade.
Table 6 shows the rates of growth or decline in manufactures exports by
the United States and by the rest of the world over 1990–2003.22 The ﬁrst
column shows that, measured in current dollars, U.S. exports declined over
the period 2000–03, after growing very rapidly in the 1990s. The second
column shows non-U.S. trade, also measured in current dollars. One can
infer from these numbers that the United States actually increased its share
of world trade in the 1990s but then suffered a sharp decline in share in
2000–03. Non-U.S. trade dipped only in 2001 and came back very strongly
indeed in 2003. Indeed, non-U.S. trade grew about as rapidly after 2000 as
it did in the 1990s, indicating that the weakness of U.S. exports was asso-
ciated with a sharp decline in the U.S. share of world trade.
A problem with measuring non-U.S. trade in dollars is that the growth
rates are sensitive to changes in dollar exchange rates. If the dollar rises
against the euro, for example, the dollar value of intra-European trade is
pushed down, and the growth rate of non-U.S. trade is reduced. The third
column of table 6 therefore measures non-U.S. trade in terms of a basket
of major currencies other than the dollar.23 This adjustment raises the esti-
mate of world growth in the 1990s, raises it again in 2001, leaves it little
changed in 2002, and lowers it sharply in 2003. It remains the case that
non-U.S. trade grows after 2000—indeed, there is now no year in which it
falls. The growth rate over the three-year period is lower, however, in the
third column than in the second.
One way to avoid the question of which currency to use in measuring the
volume of world trade is to use estimates of trade volumes, calculated using
238 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
22. The World Trade Organization provides data on world manufactures trade only
through 2002. We assume that the growth rate for 2002–03 was the same as the growth in
non-oil merchandise trade.
23. The differences between the second and third columns reﬂect the rates of change in
the Federal Reserve’s nominal index of major currencies over the years in question.
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Monthly Bulletin. There are some questions about the validity of these unit
value price measures, but, leaving those concerns aside, the data indicate that
an index of the volume of U.S. manufactures exports fell from 100 in 2000
to 87 by 2003. In contrast, the volume of European manufactures exports
rose from 100 to 105, and the volume of manufactures exports for all devel-
oped economies (including the United States) rose from 100 to 101.
These different ﬁgures all suggest that although stronger economic
growth in the rest of the world would certainly have increased U.S.
exports, it is a mistake to blame much of the U.S. export weakness on a
general slowdown in world trade—the reason emphasized by the 2004
Economic Report of the President in the quotation above. U.S. exports de-
clined after 2000 even as exports by the rest of the world grew. In short:
the biggest export problem that the United States faced after 2000 was the
decline in its share of world trade.
Understanding the Decline in the U.S. Export Share after 2000
There are three possible reasons for the decline in the U.S. share of
world manufactures exports, each distinct from the other two. The ﬁrst is
that U.S. exports may have been concentrated in commodities for which
world demand was growing relatively slowly. For example, U.S. exports
of IT goods rose rapidly in the 1990s, but then the technology sector
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exports, measured Measured by index of
Period in dollars Measured in dollars major currenciesb
1990–95 9.16 9.13 7.53
1995–2000 7.58 4.44 8.62
2000–01 –7.17 –3.18 2.61
2001–02 –5.59 5.83 4.21
2002–03 3.11 16.32 2.12
2000–03 –3.32 6.02 2.98
Sources: Data from World Trade Organization, U.S. International Trade Commission, Federal Reserve Board, and authors’
calculations.
a. Compound annual growth rates.
b. Federal Reserve’s real index of major currencies, which includes the euro, the Canadian dollar, the U.K. pound, the Swiss
franc, the Australian dollar, the Swedish krona, and the Japanese yen.
Growth in rest-of-world
manufactures exports
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 239slumped. The second possible reason is that U.S. exports may have gone
mainly to countries that had particularly weak demand for imports during
the period. And the third is that the United States may have lost competi-
tiveness against other suppliers to the world market.
A standard approach to decomposing the trade data so as to capture the
effect of world trade growth and of the three sources of changes in the U.S.
share of that growth is as follows:24 Let Vij be the value of U.S. exports of
commodity i to country j in period 1, and V'ij the value of U.S. exports of
commodity ito country jin period 2. Then we can deﬁne V and V' as follows:
In addition, let r be the percentage increase in total world exports from
period 1 to period 2, ri the percentage increase in world exports of com-
modity i from period 1 to period 2, and rij the percentage increase in world
exports of commodity i to country j from period 1 to period 2. Then, as
Edward Leamer and Robert Stern showed,25 the change in U.S. exports
from period 1 to period 2 can be expressed as follows:
The four terms on the right-hand side of this equation correspond to the four
components described above. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the change in U.S.
exports that would occur if the United States simply maintained a constant
share of world trade. The second shows the extent to which U.S. trade
changes as a result of the commodity composition of U.S. exports. The third
shows the extent to which U.S. trade changes as a result of the country com-
position of U.S. exports. The ﬁnal term is then the “competitiveness” term,
although, when calculated as a residual, this term also includes the effect of
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24. Richardson (1970, 1971a, 1971b) has made important contributions to the litera-
ture, while the discussion here is based on the exposition in Leamer and Stern (1970).
25. Leamer and Stern (1970).
26. In implementing the decomposition we have made an adjustment to the standard
model, in line with the approach used earlier. In the equations shown above, world trade
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the United Nations commodity trade database (the COMTRADE data).27
We carried out the decomposition for the period 2000 to 2003, to match
the previous analysis of employment. Unfortunately, not all countries
have reported to the United Nations for 2003, and so the trade of some
countries is excluded from the analysis. One sign of this is that U.S. mer-
chandise exports as reported below are about 18 percent smaller than the
ﬁgure shown in table 3. This does not appear to have a signiﬁcant impact
on the ﬁndings, however, as we will discuss shortly when exploring the
robustness of the results.  
The Drop in U.S. Exports from 2000 to 2003
The results of the full decomposition are shown in table 7. U.S. exports
declined by $46.2 billion over this period, or about 7.2 percent. Over the
same period, however, non-U.S. world merchandise trade expanded by
23.5 percent. If the United States had maintained a constant share of
world trade, U.S. exports would also have risen by 23.5 percent, increas-
ing by $151.7 billion rather than declining by $46.2 billion.
To what extent was this decline in export share the result of the partic-
ular mix of commodities that the United States sells in world markets?
The answer is, not at all. The overall commodity effect was very small
and, indeed, actually helped the United States a little, boosting U.S.
exports by a trivial 0.6 percent (about $4 billion). Although some prod-
ucts that the United States sells, such as high-technology goods, did not
grow as rapidly as overall world trade, others, such as auto parts, automo-
biles, medical products, and aircraft (including military aircraft and heli-
copters), grew more rapidly. Overall, then, the commodity effect was
almost a wash.
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includes exports from all countries, including the United States. The “neutral baseline”
underlying the ﬁrst term of the decomposition is that the United States will maintain a ﬁxed
share of total world trade. The problem with that approach is that, if U.S. exports fall, this
lowers total world exports. So, in this formulation, the drop in U.S. exports is attributed in
part to the drop in U.S. exports, a circularity we want to avoid. We therefore calculate non-
U.S. world trade as the total exports of all countries except the United States, and we use
this as the variable that reﬂects the changes in world demand by commodity or by country
or for total manufactured trade (this procedure affects the values of the rs).
27. The data used in the version of this paper presented at the Brookings Panel meeting
in September 2004 were different from those shown here, and there are some resulting dif-
ferences in ﬁndings. The UN COMTRADE data became available after the meeting.
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weak demand in the countries to which the United States sells? This mar-
ket distribution factor does account for a portion of the U.S. export weak-
ness: it can explain a 7.2 percent ($46.2 billion) decline in U.S. exports.28
This result is heavily attributable to the importance of U.S. trade with
Canada; the important roles of Brazil and Europe as destinations for U.S.
exports also contributed. Trade with Mexico was a positive for U.S.
exports, however, and so was trade with China.
It is worth summarizing the combined effect of the ﬁrst three terms in the
decomposition. The basic ﬁnding is that the drop in U.S. exports was not a
result of a drop in world trade, which continued to grow in 2000–03. Trade
in the countries to which the United States sells did not grow as rapidly as
overall world trade. This softens but does not change the basic conclusion
that the drop in U.S. exports was a result of a decline in the U.S. share of
trade. That drop in share was in part a reﬂection of the bursting of the high-
technology bubble, but, overall, the problem was not that the United States
was trying to sell products that the rest of the world did not want.
That leaves the “competitiveness” term as the key factor that accounts
for the drop in U.S. exports. “Loss of competitiveness” is a vague term,
however, and could refer to a number of factors. It might reﬂect new,
structural changes in U.S. export markets: for example, the entry of new
competitors such as China and India, an improvement in the relative qual-
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28. The fact that this decline is almost identical to the total decline is a coincidence and
does not hold in any of the variations of the decomposition.
Table 7. Sources of the Decline in U.S. Merchandise Exports, 2000–03a
As share of 2000 
Item Billions of dollars exports (percent)
Exports, 2000 645.9 100.0
Exports, 2003 599.7 92.8
Change in exports, 2000–03 46.2 –7.2
Impact on change in exports due to:
Growth in rest-of-world trade 151.7 23.5
Commodity composition of exports 4.0 0.6
Country composition of exports –46.2 –7.2
Change in “competitiveness”b –155.7 –24.1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on United Nations COMTRADE data.
a. Data differ from those in table 8 because of differences in sources. The COMTRADE data cover about 85 percent of U.S.
exports in 2000 and 2003.
b. Calculated as a residual.
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national corporations away from the United States toward other foreign
locations. However, such structural factors have been at work for some
time and seem unlikely to be the main reason for the rather abrupt shift
from rapid export growth in the 1990s to export decline in 2001 and 2002.
Any economic time series, of course, contains some random variation,
and the “competitiveness” term includes any residual effects not captured
in the other terms of the decomposition, as well as any measurement
errors. U.S. exports grew unusually rapidly in 2000, perhaps a carryover
from export orders placed in the booming 1990s. Some decline, at least in
the growth of exports, might well have occurred even with unchanged
economic conditions.
Finally, the competitiveness term may reﬂect the fact that U.S. goods
became relatively more expensive because of the behavior of the ex-
change rate. The dollar strengthened against other major currencies in the
late 1990s and continued to do so until early 2002. The lagged effect of
the sharp rise in the dollar was a major reason for the export decline in
2000–03, as will be shown shortly.
We tested these results of the decomposition of the U.S. export decline
for robustness as follows. As we noted earlier, the calculations in table 6
cover 2000–03 but omit some countries for which trade data are not avail-
able. Data for a broader set of countries are available in the COMTRADE
database through 2002, and so we repeated the decomposition exercise for
the period 2000 to 2002, ﬁrst using all available countries, and then only
the countries for which data exist for 2003. Restricting the sample of coun-
tries in this way made virtually no difference to the results of the decom-
position for 2000–02, and so we infer that the same restriction in 2003 has
not distorted the ﬁndings. Second, we excluded various commodities from
merchandise trade, such as energy products and items such as gold and
“returned goods.” We also performed the decomposition for manufactured
goods only. These variations again made very little difference to the re-
sults, and therefore we have reported the ﬁndings for all merchandise trade
for comparability with the earlier employment calculations.
The Impact of the Dollar on U.S. Exports
To explore quantitatively the impact of changes in exchange rates, we
used a rule-of-thumb framework based on empirical estimates of export
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effect of a change in the real dollar index on U.S. exports occurs in the
year after the devaluation, another 50 percent in the following year, and
the remaining 25 percent in the third year. The elasticity of U.S. exports
to changes in dollar exchange rates is assumed to be either 1.5 or 1.0.
We choose as our dollar index the real effective index of the dollar
against major currencies, reported by the Federal Reserve Board. We use
this index because it seems reasonable to assume that U.S. exports com-
pete primarily with the exports of other industrial countries. Table 8
shows the impact of the dollar on U.S. merchandise exports from 2000 to
2003, using the lag structure described above and the two alternative elas-
ticities of demand for exports. 
The ﬁrst column of the table again shows the actual values of U.S. mer-
chandise exports in 2000-03, based on ofﬁcial U.S. trade data. The second
column shows what exports would have been if the rise in the dollar had
not occurred (taking into account the lags). With an assumed elasticity of
1.5, exports would have risen by $96.8 billion between 2000 and 2003,
rather than falling by $54.8 billion as they did. The third and fourth
columns show the impact on exports of the rise in the dollar, in dollars
and as a percentage of the total effect, respectively. The ﬁfth column sim-
ply repeats the ﬁgures given in table 4, showing the jobs due to exports,
including the decline of 742,000 from 3.43 million in 2000 to 2.69 million
in 2003. The sixth column recalculates what these numbers would have
been had the dollar’s exchange rate not changed over the period. Produc-
tivity was growing fast enough that the number of jobs due to exports
would still have declined, but by only 183,000 instead of 742,000. As the
last column indicates, the U.S. economy would have had 559,000 addi-
tional jobs due to exports if the dollar had remained unchanged, according
to this analysis. This would have eliminated the loss of manufacturing
jobs due to trade that we identiﬁed above. 
A value of 1.5 for the exchange rate elasticity of exports is fairly high.
If the true elasticity is smaller, the impact on exports and employment
244 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
29. See, for example, Houthakker and Magee (1969), Mahdavi (2000), Marquez (2002),
Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (1998), Mann (1999), Goldstein and Khan (1985), Senhadji
and Montenegro (1999), Stone (1979), Yang (1998), and Bailliu and Bouakez (2004).
Although there are some outliers, results of most export equations fall within the range of
1.0 to 1.5 for the long-run elasticity with a three-year lag. Most of the estimates are based
on prices rather than on the exchange rate, and so we assume 100 percent pass-through of
changes in the exchange rate by U.S. exporters.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 245will be proportionally lower. The corresponding calculations for an elas-
ticity of 1.0 are shown in the bottom panel of table 8. According to the last
column of that panel, under that assumption there would have been an
additional 361,000 jobs due to exports with an unchanged dollar. Again,
the job loss due to trade would have been eliminated. 
Conclusions
We conclude that the current and lagged effect of the rising dollar was
the key reason for the weakness in U.S. exports after 2000. Stronger
growth in world trade would have helped U.S. exports, but the evidence
presented here indicates that the main factor contributing to this export
weakness was a decline in the U.S. share of world exports. The slump in
trade in high-technology products lowered U.S. exports after 2000, but
this impact was largely offset by the relative strength of demand for the
other goods that the United States sells in world markets. A number of
alternative explanations for the weakness of U.S. exports have been pre-
sented by others. One is that the United States has lost competitiveness
to China; a second is that U.S. multinational firms are increasingly
sourcing their exports from foreign countries. But our analysis suggests
that the impact of the stronger dollar is sufficient to account for most of
the erosion in the U.S. share of trade in world markets and for the nega-
tive impact of trade on employment.
The competitiveness effect reported in table 7 was $155.7 billion, but
that figure was derived from a database that excluded some countries.
Simply scaling up that figure to make it comparable to table 8 gives a
competitiveness effect of $189.1 billion in 2003. With an elasticity of
1.5 for the exchange rate, the rise in the dollar can explain fully 80 per-
cent of this figure. It is thus by far the most compelling explanation of
the weakness of U.S. exports and hence of the loss of manufacturing jobs
due to trade.
We have not tried to determine what explains the change in the dollar
exchange rate. One plausible explanation is that the rapid growth associ-
ated with the technology boom in the 1990s created investment opportu-
nities that attracted capital to the United States. When the boom subsided,
however, the lagged effects of the strong dollar on U.S. exports served to
compound the difﬁculties facing U.S. manufactures because of stagnant
domestic demand. As private capital ﬂows subsided after 2000, they were
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2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 246replaced to a large extent by foreign government purchases of U.S. assets
to keep the dollar high and reduce its rate of decline.
The Impact of Services Sector Offshoring to India on U.S. Jobs
The development of the business services sector in India, geared
heavily to exporting to the United States, has added a new layer of 
concern about the availability of good jobs in this country. The impact
of trade on U.S. manufacturing jobs has been a matter of debate for
many years, and one popular response has been to promote the benefits
of education. Low-skilled manual jobs in manufacturing are being
shifted overseas, it is argued, but American workers can still earn high
wages provided they increase their level of skill and education. The
increase in the return to education over the past twenty years has rein-
forced this idea.
The rapid growth of services sector offshoring in India has rocked this
conventional wisdom.30 With large numbers of highly motivated, college-
educated, English-speaking workers becoming available in India, in part
through  improved access to telecommunications capabilities, white-collar
workers in the United States now feel threatened.
This section explores the extent to which the weakness in job creation
in the U.S. services sector during 2000–03, noted at the beginning of this
paper, can be attributed to the movement of service jobs to India. Here
as in the earlier discussion, we are well aware that, in a full, long-term,
general equilibrium analysis there is no reason why an expansion of
trade should induce a loss of U.S. jobs in the aggregate. But getting a
sense of the number of jobs that may have been shifted from the United
States to India is important to putting services sector offshoring in the
right perspective.
Gauging the Impact of Offshoring to India
NASSCOM (National Association of Software and Service Compa-
nies) is an Indian trade association that tracks the newly emerging busi-
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30. There is now a large literature on the impact of offshoring: for example, Schultze
(2004), Brainard and Litan (2004), Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan (forthcoming),
Baily and Farrell (2004), Atkinson (2004), and Bardhan and Kroll (2003).
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panies that provide IT services, such as computer programming, as well
as other business services (called business process offshoring or 
IT-enabled services) such as call centers and back ofﬁce processing (for
banks and insurance companies, for example). 
The initial impetus to the development of this industry came in part
from General Electric Company, which in the 1990s saw the potential for
cost savings from the availability of a skilled low-cost work force. In the
past, foreign companies operating in India, and even domestic companies,
faced substantial barriers from the country’s  maze of regulations and lack
of infrastructure. Reliable electric power and telecommunications were
not readily available, and it took much time and persistence before Gen-
eral Electric was able to start offshoring. The ﬁrst movers were foreign
multinationals like General Electric and the U.K.-based HSBC Group, but
the industry has shifted over time so that local companies such as Daksh,
Spectramind, Infosys, and Wipro have contributed to the growth in recent
years. It remains the case, however, that two-thirds of the industry con-
sists of captive producers (those owned by or afﬁliated with foreign multi-
nationals, many of them U.S. and British companies).
The first column of table 9 shows that, over the period from 
NASSCOM’s 2000/01 ﬁscal year to its 2003/04 ﬁscal year (NASSCOM’s
ﬁscal year ends with the ﬁrst quarter), software employment in India
increased by 200,000 workers. Of these, 134,000 were involved in ser-
vices exported to the United States. On the assumption that this work
would have required the same number of employees in the United
States—that is, that the productivity of the U.S. and Indian software
industries are the same, this implies a transfer of 134,000 U.S. jobs.
The second column of table 9 shows a comparable computation for
business process offshoring. Employment in these activities in India
increased by 175,500 workers, 140,400 of whom produced services that
were exported to the United States. Again assuming a one-for-one job
transfer, this means a loss of 140,400 U.S. jobs in this service activity.
The assumption of comparable productivity is a strong one. Some who
have studied the Indian industry and visited its facilities report that the
248 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
31. A description of NASSCOM and a variety of data series are available on the orga-
nization’s website. This section uses information collected as part of the McKinsey Global
Institute (2003) case study of India offshoring. 
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 248actual productivity differences are mixed. There is some evidence that
call centers in India are more productive than their U.S. counterparts,
because they can attract higher-quality employees (college graduates in
India versus high school graduates in the United States). Also, the jobs are
not well liked by U.S. workers, so that turnover in the U.S. call centers is
very high, affecting productivity for the worse.32 On balance, however, it
is likely that productivity would be higher in the United States, because
the higher-value-added programming tasks tend to remain onshore,
whereas more of the routine code development is carried out in India.
Thus the job loss estimates in the table probably exceed the actual losses.
This conclusion is reinforced by two related factors. First, some of the
tasks that moved to India would otherwise have been performed by auto-
mated IT hardware and software in the United States; hence the jobs
would have been lost in any case. Voice response units replacing call cen-
ter workers are an example. Second, because the services being provided
from India are cheaper than equivalent services provided from within the
United States, it is likely that a greater quantity of these services are sold
than if Indian offshoring were not available, and that these services are
performed in a more labor-intensive fashion.
The last column of table 9 compares the estimated total number of ser-
vices sector jobs offshored to India with the change in total U.S. services
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32. See, for example, McKinsey Global Institute (2003).
Table 9. Estimated Number of Jobs Offshored to India, 2001/02–2003/04a
Thousands 
Business process
Item Software offshoring Total
Total increase in employment in India 200.0 175.5 375.5
Of which: jobs involved in export to U.S. 134.0 140.4 274.4
U.S. employment lossb 134.0 140.4 274.4
Average per year 91.5




Sources: NASSCOM, Bureau of Labor Statistics data, and authors’ calculations.
a. Years are ﬁscal years ending with the ﬁrst quarter.
b. Assuming one-for-one substitution.
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process industries suggests that at most about 275,000 jobs moved to
India over the three-year period 2000/01 to 2003/04, for an annual aver-
age change of about 91,500 jobs. For the displaced workers the costs of
this increase in trade were surely substantial, but a job shift of this size is
very small compared with the 2.1 million service jobs created in the
United States in a typical year during the 1990s; it is even small compared
with the net annual increase from 2000 to 2003, when annual service job
creation fell to about 327,000.
Comparing the NASSCOM Data with U.S. Services Trade Data
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), total U.S. ser-
vices trade with India is very small, and indeed the United States actually
runs a surplus. Moreover, total U.S. services imports from India actually
declined between 2000 and 2002. (“Services trade” refers to private ser-
vices trade unless stated otherwise.) The BEA data, shown in ﬁgure 6,
indicate that services imports from India rose fairly strongly from 1995 to
2000, more than doubling in current dollars from about $850 million to
$1.90 billion, but subsequently fell back to $1.84 billion in 2002. Services
exports to India have been consistently larger than services imports from
India, according to the BEA, and have grown very rapidly over time,
especially after 1999. Exports in 2002 are reported as $3.28 billion.
The BEA data do not indicate the nature of the services that are traded,
but the discrepancy with the NASSCOM data is already clear. According
to NASSCOM, IT and business process services exports from India to the
United States were around $6 billion in 2002, more than triple the BEA’s
ﬁgure for total U.S. services imports from India in that year. There are
several reasons why the BEA data may understate imports from India, and
why the NASSCOM data may overstate exports to the United States.
Most likely both errors are occurring. But, before we dissect this discrep-
ancy, it is worth noting one important inference to be drawn from the
BEA data. As already noted, the United States is not simply an importer
of services from India; it is also a signiﬁcant and growing exporter of ser-
vices to India. As the Indian economy grows, it is likely to provide an
increasing market for U.S. services and to contribute to job creation in
services industries where the United States has a comparative advantage.
The analysis of offshoring presented above leaves out this part of the
employment effects of services trade between the two countries.
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the recent offshoring, since the imports in question may be destined to
sectors not traditionally well covered by surveys designed to pick up
international trade.33 In particular, the BEA misses much of the most im-
portant part of IT services imports from India, namely, “bundled ser-
vices”—software sold along with the computer hardware purchased by
end-users. The BEA may also classify some services imports as goods
imports (for example, if the software is to be used in a packaged software
product).34 In addition, since much of the activity in India is taking place
in companies that are subsidiaries of U.S. companies or otherwise afﬁli-
ated with them, these companies have some discretion about where the
disbursements are recorded and at what price.
In general, the data collection and analysis at BEA are very strong, and
the U.S. trade data are better and more extensive than data available from
most other countries. But BEA has limited resources and can only use the
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33. It is inherently easier for Indian statisticians to cover that country’s limited number
of IT services exporters than it is for the BEA to cover the entire spectrum of potential IT
services importers in the U.S. economy, especially at a time when such imports may be
going to new sectors.
34. This problem is not large, however: the United States imports less than $10 million
worth of Records, Tapes, and Discs (SITC End-use Category 41220) a year.
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2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 251data available to it from existing surveys, which were not set up to moni-
tor services sector offshoring from India. There is a large overall statisti-
cal discrepancy in the international accounts, which makes it evident that
not all international transactions are captured. The magnitude and time
pattern of the BEA data on services imports from India also seem totally
out of line with the rapid growth and development of the IT and business
process industries, located in India and serving the U.S. market, which is
visible to Indians themselves and to journalists and researchers from the
United States. 
The most important reason why the NASSCOM data may exaggerate
India’s exports is that some fraction of the software services provided by
companies reporting to NASSCOM is performed by employees who are
actually located in the United States—for example, the work of program-
mers on assignment to and located in the United States may be counted as
Indian exports if they are working under contract to a company based in
India. NASSCOM itself states on its website that 40 percent of its IT
activities are associated with personnel located at the customer’s site.
BEA Director Steven Landefeld has noted that the payments made to
these persons would not be counted as imports to the United States, nor in
his view should they be.35 If this view is correct, we should scale back the
numbers given earlier by 40 percent for the IT jobs. The estimate of the
software jobs transferred would drop from 134,000 over three years to
80,400.
We chose not to scale back the earlier estimates, however, for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, applying the 40 percent ﬁgure for Indian personnel
located in the United States seems inconsistent with U.S. visa data
reported by the Department of Homeland Security (or the Immigration
and Naturalization Service). In particular, the number of Indians on H1-B
visas (issued to workers in specialty occupations) in the United States was
only 81,000 (47,500 of whom worked in computer-related ﬁelds) in 2002,
and indeed was lower than the level in 2000. The number on L-1 visas
(intercompany transfers) was only 20,400 and had also fallen since 2000.
On this evidence it seems that the number of Indians transferred to U.S.
companies has been falling since 2000, not rising, which makes it very
hard to attribute any of the growth in employment reported in the 
NASSCOM employment data to increases in persons working in the
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35. Steven Landefeld, personal communication with the authors, April 7, 2004.
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people, but we know that entering the United States has become much
more difﬁcult since September 2001. Either a lot of employees of Indian
companies have green cards or U.S. citizenship, or the 40 percent ﬁgure is
wrong.36
The second reason is that this paper is exploring the decline in U.S.
payroll employment. If Indian workers employed by establishments
located in India are being assigned to projects located in U.S. companies’
domestic facilities, these workers will not show up on the U.S. payroll
survey.37 They are not on the payroll of a U.S. company. From the per-
spective of understanding U.S. payroll employment, it is appropriate to
count these jobs as having been offshored to Indian workers and com-
panies, regardless of how their salaries either are or should be counted in
the U.S. balance of trade data.
Finally, and most important, the purpose of this exercise is to show that
the offshoring of services sector jobs to India, so far, has been small com-
pared with total services sector employment in the United States. If the
NASSCOM data do overstate the magnitude of offshoring, then that con-
clusion will hold even more strongly. The NASSCOM data on the off-
shoring of services from the United States then provide an upper bound
on the actual value of U.S. services imports and on the number of jobs
previously performed in the United States that are now being performed
in India.
U.S. Employment in Occupations Likely
to Have Been Affected by Offshoring
Given the enormous size of the services sector in the United States
(about 110 million workers in 2004), it is not really a surprise to find that
services sector offshoring to India so far has not been large in relation to
total U.S. services employment. But it is certainly possible that the
impact on the U.S. labor market of the growth of the Indian industry has
been larger for IT and IT-enabled occupations. Our conclusion is that,
yes, offshoring to India has been large enough to have had some impact
on IT jobs in the United States. However, we find that employment in the
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36. Thus far we have not been able to receive clariﬁcation from NASSCOM about the
validity of the 40 percent ﬁgure.
37. This was conﬁrmed by a phone conversation with Bureau of Labor Statistics staff.
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 253IT sector has actually been surprisingly strong in the past few years,
especially if one allows for the unsustainable surge in employment in
2000.
Table 10 uses data from the OES, described above, with a focus on
employment patterns between 1999 and 2003 in those occupations that
may have been affected by offshoring.38 Looking first at the computer-
related services occupations (top panel of table 10), we find only a mod-
est drop in total employment—about 65,500 over 2000–03, or about 2.5
percent.39 Moreover, as Catherine Mann has pointed out, the employ-
ment decline after 2000 followed a huge technology boom in the late
1990s, which culminated in a surge of employment and investment
aimed at resolving the Y2K problem.40 The employment levels reached
in 2000 were not sustainable, regardless of what happened to U.S. ser-
vices trade with India. As one sign of this, employment in computer
occupations was actually over 230,000 higher in 2003 than it had been
in 1999 (the earliest year for which these data are available). The short
time period makes it impossible to be sure of the trends, but the figures
for 1999–2003 tentatively suggest an underlying trend toward increas-
ing employment in computer occupations over the period, with a tem-
porary surge in 2000 that was followed by a temporary downward
adjustment.
The table does show some shift in the mix of employment within com-
puter occupations. The biggest job losers were computer programmers
and computer support personnel, about 139,000 of whom lost jobs over
2000–03. Among computer support personnel there was a large surge in
employment between 1999 and 2000, strongly suggesting a Y2K effect.
Employment in 2003 remained above the level in 1999.
For computer programmers, however, the decline in employment could
have been the result of offshoring to India. Table 10 shows a decline of
99,090 in U.S. computer programming jobs from 2000 to 2003. Our esti-
mate of IT jobs in India in table 9 suggests that as many as 134,000 such
jobs were created in India to serve the United States. Our estimate of the
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38. The table is adapted from similar tables in Mann (2003) and Kirkegaard (2004). We
have beneﬁted from their analysis of high-technology employment.
39. The analysis in this section does not include production workers in the IT hardware
industry. We showed above that manufacturing employment in the computer and semi-
conductor industries fell very sharply after 2000.
40. Mann (2003).







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 255shift of jobs to India is probably too high, but nevertheless these ﬁgures
indicate the possibility that the loss of U.S. programming jobs was the
result of a movement of work to India.
As already noted, comparative advantage within the computer pro-
gramming sector may have led, as trade with India became cheaper and
easier, to basic programming tasks being offshored while the higher-end
activities continued to expand in the United States. Between 2000 and
2003 there were increases in the employment of computer software
engineers (applications and systems) even as employment of computer
programmers declined. The same holds even more strongly from 1999
to 2003. 
In short, the availability of low-cost programming services from India
surely has had an impact on the U.S. software industry. Indeed, one
would expect such an impact, because U.S. customers benefit from the
effects of the input price reduction generated by the availability of low-
cost programmers. 
The beneﬁts from increased services trade will be reduced if such trade
results in the permanent loss of U.S. human capital. This would occur if
trained programmers in the United States were never reemployed or were
moved to jobs that did not make use of the programming skills they had
acquired. Press accounts provide anecdotal evidence that some U.S.
workers have indeed experienced such a loss of human capital. Although
this situation is attributable in part to offshoring, there were also mis-
perceptions in the late 1990s about the sustainability of the technology
boom.
In addition, the employment data in table 10 suggest that the loss of
jobs in the technology sector was actually relatively small over all. Given
the slump in the U.S. technology sector and in the domestic demand for
IT, it is actually very surprising that employment in computer occupations
fell so little between 2000 and 2003 and that it remains well above the
1999 employment level.
The bottom panel of table 10 shows that IT-enabled low-wage occu-
pations, such as telemarketers, computer operators, and word proces-
sors, experienced substantial employment declines—nearly 300,000
over the 2000–03 period and well over 400,000 from 1999 through
2003. The declines occurred across the board in these occupations, and
some were probably due to activities being shifted overseas. In other
cases, however, technology was the culprit. For example, employment
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now carry out that function themselves on personal computers instead
of using dictation or handwritten material. Similarly, computer opera-
tors are not needed in the same numbers because of the shift away from
mainframes.
It is noteworthy that wages for these occupations are not very high—in
the $10 to $15 an hour range. That is certainly better than the minimum
wage, but not so high that alternative jobs at similar pay would be difﬁcult
to ﬁnd in most urban labor markets. Voluntary turnover rates are also
fairly high among positions at that level. As discussed previously, this
suggests that human capital losses would be limited. We do not wish to
minimize the personal cost borne by those whose jobs are shifted over-
seas, but the adjustment cost of this offshoring to the labor market as a
whole should not be very high.
Conclusions
Even under assumptions that may greatly overstate the offshoring of
services sector jobs to India, we ﬁnd that press reports and popular dis-
cussion of the issue greatly exaggerate its importance to the U.S. labor
market. The evidence so far suggests that the number of jobs transferred
to India is tiny relative to total employment in the U.S. services sector.
Within computer occupations, we ﬁnd that the net job loss for computer
programmers in the United States is likely attributable to offshoring.
However, the surprising fact is how little employment in computer ser-
vices has fallen in recent years, given the weakness in U.S. domestic
demand for technology services.
The Impact of Expected Future Offshoring in Services
One possible rejoinder to this conclusion is that what has happened so
far may be minor, but that in the future the offshoring of services sector
jobs will affect the U.S. labor market more severely. We explore that pos-
sibility next.
The debate over the effects of electronic offshoring in the long run has
reﬂected a variety of concerns. A recent paper by Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind
Panagariya, and T. N. Srinivasan considers the impact of offshoring on
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structure of U.S. employment. In the short run the United States may run
larger trade deﬁcits as a result of the increase in services sector off-
shoring, but over the long run any increase in services imports will have
to be paid for by additional net exports—that is, by exporting more goods
and services or reducing imports of other goods and services. Thus,
although outsourcing could mean fewer services jobs in some sectors, it
could also mean more jobs in other sectors that produce tradable goods
and services.
In this analysis the ﬁrst question to be addressed is, How large is out-
sourcing likely to be? Although any forecast of the future magnitude of
services sector offshoring is subject to great uncertainty, the most fre-
quently quoted ﬁgures, those compiled by Forrester Research, suggest
that 3.4 million U.S. service jobs will be offshored to India and other
countries by 2015.42 These estimates derive from a series of company
interviews in both the United States and India. Forrester attempted to
assess which U.S. occupations were amenable to offshoring, what skills
were available overseas, and what investments were being made or
planned to develop capabilities overseas.43
The Forrester study ﬁnds that 315,000 service jobs had already been
offshored by 2003 and that an additional 3.1 million jobs would move off-
shore by 2015—hence the estimated total of 3.4 million. By far the largest
occupational category affected is ofﬁce workers, accounting for nearly
half of the jobs offshored. But the study further suggests that a range of
possible employment categories could be offshored, including computer,
business, management, and sales workers, and workers in architecture
and the life sciences.44
Although one should not place undue conﬁdence in the Forrester num-
bers, they are sufﬁciently interesting for their implications to be explored.
Moreover, in different simulation runs, we used some alternative assump-
tions about the magnitude of offshoring. The results were roughly linear,
so that those who believe that the true number of offshored jobs will be
half as great, or twice as great, as our estimates can simply halve or dou-
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41. Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan (fothcoming); Samuelson (2004).
42. McCarthy and others (forthcoming).
43. McCarthy and others (2004, p. 4).
44. McCarthy and others (2004, p. 5).
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the economy.  
To formulate the simulations, we worked with Ben Herzon and Joel
Prakken of Macroeconomic Advisers (MA) to see how the level of off-
shoring predicted by Forrester would affect the economy. The difﬁcult
part of this analysis is to capture in a sensible fashion the impact of the
“shock” imparted to the economy by the rapid increase in services sector
offshoring. We experimented with various approaches and will report the
two that, together, provide the most helpful insights. The impact of off-
shoring is inferred from the deviations of our “offshoring” simulations
from MA’s baseline simulation; therefore we begin by offering a sense of
what the baseline looks like.
The Baseline Scenario
MA’s long-term simulations do not attempt to capture cyclical variations
of the economy more than a few quarters out. This is standard practice for
such forecasting models, for example those of the Council of Economic
Advisers and the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, as well as the economic
assumptions used by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce in its budget forecast-
ing. The baseline simulation embodies an implicit Federal Reserve reaction
function that ensures that, in the absence of shocks, the economy remains
close to full employment, assumed to be consistent with an unemployment
rate of around 5.3 percent. The baseline used for this paper uses actual data
through the ﬁrst quarter of 2004 and thus does not reﬂect the increases in oil
prices and the weakening of the U.S. economy that occurred in mid-2004
(what Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has referred to as a “soft
patch”). In this baseline the U.S. economy continues its cyclical recovery,
and the unemployment rate falls to its target range by the end of 2004.
These characteristics of the baseline, together with the gradual, smooth
ramp-up of offshoring that is built into the Forrester estimates, mean that
for our purposes there is little signiﬁcant information to be obtained from
the quarter-to-quarter changes in the economic variables. We compare the
starting point of the baseline (in the ﬁrst quarter of 2004) with the end
point in the fourth quarter of 2015. The variables move relatively
smoothly during the intermediate years.
When the MA model is run without adjustments, it predicts continuing
large current account deﬁcits for the United States. However, MA’s current
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will decline substantially over the next ten years or so.45 The baseline sim-
ulation therefore shows a gradual decline in the dollar of around 21 percent
and a reduction of the U.S. current account deﬁcit to around $100 billion,
or 0.5 percent of the predicted $20 trillion current-dollar U.S. GDP in
2015:4. The downward adjustment of the current account, accompanied
by a shift in real net exports from negative to positive, is accomplished
without imposing excessively high interest rates, because a substantial
reduction in the federal budget deﬁcit is assumed over the same period.
The baseline thus builds in a rather smooth resolution of the two big
deﬁcit problems facing today’s economy.
Table 11 reports the values for a range of variables in the starting and
ending quarters of the baseline and their growth rates when appropriate.
Over the nearly twelve-year forecast period, real GDP grows at 2.9 per-
cent a year and inﬂation averages a bit under 2.0 percent a year. Nonfarm
payroll employment rises at 0.9 percent a year over the period, and labor
productivity growth in the nonfarm business sector is 2.3 percent a year.
The decline in the dollar contributes to strong growth of real U.S. non-
farm merchandise exports, at a rate of 7.3 percent a year; real services
export growth is similar. Since trend productivity growth in the manufac-
turing sector is less than 7.3 percent a year, the implied growth of real
exports would contribute positively to manufacturing employment in this
baseline simulation. The baseline simulation implies that trade will
increase manufacturing employment going forward. Real nonpetroleum
imports are dampened by the fall in the dollar and grow at 5.6 percent a
year. Real petroleum imports (not shown) grow even more slowly. Real
services imports in the baseline are also dampened by the dollar decline
and by rising prices, and they grow relatively slowly.
The baseline projections can be combined with our estimates of
employment due to exports and imports in 2003, reported in table 4, to
provide estimates of changes in employment due to trade between 2003
and 2015. To do this, it is necessary to make an assumption about what
rate of labor productivity growth in manufacturing would be associated
with a 2.3 percent annual average growth rate for nonfarm business out-
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45. It is notoriously difﬁcult to model exchange rate determination econometrically; in
particular, it is very difﬁcult to capture the downward pressure on the dollar that will likely
come about (and in part has already come about) as dollar assets rise as a share of the port-
folio of the rest of the world.
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 260put. Fortunately for our purposes, it turns out that, between 1992 and
2003, annual growth in output per hour in nonfarm business averaged 2.3
percent, exactly the same as assumed in the baseline. Since annual growth
in output per worker-hour in manufacturing between 1992 and 2003 aver-
aged 3.9 percent, we assume that the same rate will prevail between 2003
and 2015. This leads us to conclude that, in the baseline, the employment
content of exports will increase by 3.4 percent a year (7.3 percent – 3.9
percent), while the employment content of imports will rise at 1.7 percent
a year (5.6 percent – 3.9 percent). This level of performance in merchan-
dise trade would boost manufacturing employment by 316,000 by 2015.
Different people have different views about the future path of the U.S.
economy. Some have argued that an economic crisis may have to occur
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Table 11. Characteristics of Baseline Scenario
Growth rate
Item 2004:1 2015:4 (percent a year)
Real GDP (billions of chained 2000 dollars) 10,716.0 14,986.1 2.90
Nominal GDP (billions of current dollars) 11,459.6 19,679.2 4.71
Chain PCE deﬂator (2000 = 100)a 106.6 134.0 1.97
Unemployment rate (percent) 5.63 5.28 n.a.
Nonfarm business sector employment (millions) 108.3 120.7 0.93
Output per hour in nonfarm business sector  
(chained 2000 dollars) 45.80 59.77 2.29
Federal funds rate (percent a year) 1.00 6.33 n.a.
Yield on ten-year Treasury note (percent a year) 4.01 7.11 n.a.
Nominal exchange rate (1997 = 100)b 113.30 96.94 n.a.
Current account balance (billions of current dollars) –575.7 –99.0 n.a.
Net goods and services exports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) –525.2 210.7 n.a.
Nonfarm merchandise exports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 717.9 1,642.9 7.30
Total merchandise exports  
(billions of current dollars) 788.3 2,040.5 8.43
Services exports (billions of chained 2000 dollars) 330.6 736.2 7.05
Nonpetroleum merchandise imports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 1,244.7 1,807.1 3.22
Total merchandise imports  
(billions of current dollars) 1,384.5 2,508.3 5.19
Services imports (billions of chained 2000 dollars) 243.1 260.8 0.60
Services imports (billions of current dollars) 278.4 456.3 4.29
Source: Authors’ simulations using the Macroeconomic Advisers’ model.
a. PCE, personal consumption expenditures.
b. Trade–weighted index of thirty-ﬁve currencies against the dollar.
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shocks could disrupt economic growth. Others argue that large U.S. cur-
rent account or budget deﬁcits, or both, can continue indeﬁnitely. How-
ever, the MA baseline looks exactly right for the purpose here. We want
to abstract from other economic issues and focus on the impact of off-
shoring. To what extent services sector offshoring might interact with
other shocks we leave to others to determine.
The Macroeconomic Effect of Services Sector Offshoring: 
Adding More Imports
One simple way to model the impact of services offshoring is to
impose on the model an increase in the demand for services imports. We
asked MA to adjust the services import equation so as to shift the demand
curve outward. Using the Forrester employment data and the U.S. wage-
cost numbers as a basis, we estimated what the increase in imports would
be, under the assumption that the imported services would cost only half
as much as supplying the equivalent services domestically.46
If the dollar exchange rate is left unchanged, the increase in imports
translates into an increased current account deﬁcit. We judged that a more
neutral comparison with the baseline would result from imposing an addi-
tional decline in the dollar as a result of the increased offshoring, in order
to keep the current account balance the same as in the baseline.
Table 12 summarizes the results of this simulation. The model trans-
lates the increase in imports into an immediate negative shock to GDP,
which Federal Reserve policy must offset in order to preserve employ-
ment. Over time, however, the greater decline in the dollar stimulates
exports and slows real import growth. By the end of the simulation run,
the dollar is 7.5 below its baseline level, and this has increased real mer-
chandise exports and reduced real merchandise imports. The lower dollar
has pushed inﬂation up a little and pushed up interest rates. With the
higher interest rates there is a slight reduction in productivity growth, and
real GDP is down very slightly by 2015 compared with the baseline. In
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46. The 50 percent ﬁgure is our estimate based on McKinsey Global Institute (2003). If
anything, the cost would be somewhat less than 50 percent—in the 45 to 50 percent range.
It is possible that the relative cost calculation would change over time as the foreign indus-
try expands. However, Indian businesses are expanding their operations outside of their
current region, to avoid rising labor costs, and other countries are investing in the infra-
structure and language training that would allow them to enter the market.
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chandise exports to help pay for them. This in turn requires a real deval-
uation of the dollar and thus a reduction in the U.S. terms of trade, which
also has employment consequences for manufacturing.
Compared with the baseline, the value of merchandise exports in-
creases by $137.1 billion, or 6.7 percent, while the value of merchandise
imports falls by 1.2 percent. We estimate that this shift would lead to an
additional 335,000 jobs in manufacturing in 2015. This highlights the fact
that, once the current account is adjusted, the impact of increased spend-
ing on services imports leads to increased employment in manufacturing.
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Table 12. Scenario Modeling Impact of Offshoring as Increase in Services Imports
Change from Growth rate,
baseline 2004:1–2015:4
Item 2015:4 2015:4 (percent a year)
Real GDP (billions of chained 2000 dollars) 14,895.7 –90.4 2.8
Nominal GDP (billions of current dollars) 19,535.2 –144.0 4.6
Chain PCE deﬂator (2000 = 100)a 134.8 0.9 2.0
Unemployment rate (percent) 5.2 0.1 n.a.
Nonfarm business sector employment (millions) 120.6 –0.1 0.9
Output per hour in nonfarm business sector 
(chained 2000 dollars) 59.4 –0.4 2.2
Federal funds rate (percent a year) 6.9 0.6 n.a.
Yield on ten-year Treasury note (percent a year) 7.56 0.45 n.a.
Nominal exchange rate (1997 = 100)b 89.4 –7.5 n.a.
Current account balance  
(billions of current dollars) –97.7 1.3 n.a.
Net goods and services exports 
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 331.1 120.4 n.a.
Nonfarm merchandise exports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 1,686.0 43.1 7.5
Total merchandise exports  
(billions of current dollars) 2,177.7 137.1 9.0
Services exports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 738.9 2.7 7.1
Nonpetroleum merchandise imports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 1,649.6 –157.4 2.4
Total merchandise imports  
(billions of current dollars) 2,477.9 –30.4 5.1
Services imports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 334.7 73.9 2.8
Services imports (billions of current dollars) 630.8 174.5 7.2
Source: Authors’ simulations using the Macroeconomic Advisers’ model.
a. PCE, personal consumption expenditures.
b. Trade–weighted index of thirty–ﬁve currencies against the dollar.
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 263In summary, this simulation run, modeled as a case in which the United
States has effectively developed an increased taste for services imports,
results in a modest negative for the economy: inﬂation, productivity, and
the terms of trade are all negatively affected. The job displacement hap-
pens slowly, based on the Forrester assessment, and this allows Federal
Reserve policy to maintain full employment. The MA model is a general
equilibrium model, and it predicts that most of the workers displaced
from their jobs will ﬁnd new ones. There is a predicted boost to manufac-
turing employment, although overall employment is essentially the same
in this simulation run as it is in the baseline.
The Macroeconomic Effect of Services Sector Offshoring: A Decline
in the Price of Services Imports
The previous simulation is a useful starting point, but it does not reﬂect
the underlying economics of services sector offshoring. What is the
underlying shock that triggers the increased offshoring that Forrester pre-
dicts? Presumably, it is that improved technology and infrastructure com-
bined with capital and training have lowered the price that the United
States pays for services sector imports. As a result, the United States buys
more of them. For any given value of the dollar, the decline in import
prices improves the U.S. terms of trade.
With offshoring, U.S. companies find they can produce the same level
of sales or gross output with fewer domestic workers. Initially, their
profitability rises as they sell at the same price domestically with reduced
costs (they pay only 50 percent of the cost for the activities they off-
shore). Over time, however, competition works to lower prices and dis-
tributes the benefits back to consumers. Productivity rises within the
companies doing the offshoring. They buy more foreign inputs but save
labor, and, since they have reduced their costs, their productivity is
higher. Productivity rises for the U.S. economy as a whole if the workers
and capital displaced by the increased services imports are reemployed
in activities that generate more than enough real output to pay for the
increase in real services imports.
In order to capture this process, MA adjusted the price of services
imports down by an amount large enough to induce an increase in the real
quantity of services imports that, in turn, was large enough to displace the
number of workers that Forrester predicts will be displaced. In the same
quarter in which the increased offshoring takes place, there is a drop in
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time, domestic prices fall and Federal Reserve policy acts to restore
employment. Domestic workers who are displaced are reabsorbed into the
economy, according the normal dynamics built into the MA model.
Table 13 summarizes the results of the simulations. Offshoring of the
magnitude suggested by Forrester is enough to add 0.2 percentage point to
annual GDP growth and nearly 0.3 percentage point a year to growth in
labor productivity in the nonfarm business sector. Real GDP is $384 bil-
lion higher by 2015. Total employment and unemployment are essentially
the same as in the baseline. The inﬂation rate has been lowered by 
0.25 percentage point a year, even though the dollar is down 4.8 percent.
As one would expect, real services imports are higher in this simula-
tion, but services imports in current dollars are actually slightly lower.
The fall in the price of imports means that the United States can buy more
real imports for the same dollar cost. The decline in the dollar partially
offsets the opening up of the low-cost offshoring opportunity.47
Table 13 shows that the values of merchandise exports and imports
both rise—by $101.6 billion and $63.5 billion, respectively—relative to
the baseline. In this scenario manufacturing employment due to trade
increases by 62,000. In both simulations, therefore, more services imports
implies more jobs in manufacturing over the long run.
The idea that offshoring could raise U.S. productivity and hence U.S.
GDP is not a surprise. That is, after all, what we expect to be the beneﬁt of
expanded trade. The magnitude of the increments to these variables, how-
ever, is larger than we anticipated. It is not easy to determine how changes
in variables play out through the structure of a large macroeconomic
model, but it seems that the reason for the “multiplier effect” of off-
shoring on real GDP is that the Federal Reserve follows a path of lower
interest rates in this simulation. It does that because domestic labor is
being released as a result of the job displacement and because inﬂation is
lower as a result of the cheaper services imports. In the MA model the
lower interest rates have a positive impact on domestic investment, and
this contributes to the growth in productivity and hence in GDP.
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47. The decline in the dollar increases merchandise exports in these results. That result
is plausible enough, but it was not robust across the different model runs. The MA model’s
price equations capture relative price effects between traded goods and services prices and
the price of domestic production. Depending on the speciﬁcation, these effects can elimi-
nate the increase in merchandise exports.
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simulation is correct, the model is providing a valid lesson. The impact of
offshoring that is being captured in the second run is basically the same as
that of an opening to trade, such as a reduction in tariffs. And a range of
empirical evidence supports the view that trade expansion results in
higher GDP.48
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Table 13. Scenario Modeling Impact of Offshoring as Reduction in Price 
of Services Imports
Change from Growth rate,
baseline 2004:1–2015:4
Item 2015:4 2015:4 (percent a year)
Real GDP (billions of chained 2000 dollars) 15,369.9 383.8 3.12
Nominal GDP (billions of current dollars) 19,687.5 8.3 4.71
Chain PCE deﬂator (2000 = 100)a 130.2 –3.7 1.72
Unemployment rate (percent) 5.3 0.0 n.a.
Nonfarm business sector employment (millions) 120.7 –0.0 0.93
Output per hour in nonfarm business sector 
(chained 2000 dollars) 61.7 1.9 2.57
Federal funds rate (percent a year) 5.3 –1.0 15.27
Yield on ten-year Treasury note (percent a year) 6.36 –0.75 3.98
Nominal exchange rate (1997 = 100)b 93.2 –3.7 n.a.
Current account balance  
(billions of current dollars) –98.5 0.6 n.a.
Net goods and services exports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 190.5 –20.2 n.a.
Nonfarm merchandise exports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 1,721.6 78.7 7.73
Total merchandise exports  
(billions of current dollars) 2,142.2 101.6 8.88
Services exports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 764.1 27.9 7.39
Nonpetroleum merchandise imports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 1,824.5 17.4 3.31
Total merchandise imports  
(billions of current dollars) 2,571.7 63.5 5.41
Services imports  
(billions of chained 2000 dollars) 350.6 89.8 3.17
Services imports (billions of current dollars) 449.4 –6.9 4.16
Source: Authors’ simulations using the Macroeconomic Advisers’ model.
a. PCE, personal consumption expenditures.
b. Trade-weighted index of thirty-ﬁve currencies against the dollar.
48. See Cline (2004) for a summary of the evidence and references.
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The simulation runs on the MA model do not tell us anything about the
distribution of wages across different types of workers, but they do make
a prediction about total wages (or rather, total compensation of employ-
ees) and proﬁts. Table 14 reports the ﬁndings. The simulation in which
the services import equation was add-factored up showed a negative
effect on the economy, and table 14 indicates that this loss is imposed on
employees. Real compensation is reduced by nearly $160 billion by 2015,
or 1.9 percent. Proﬁts remain essentially unaffected in this simulation.
In contrast, the simulation in which the price of imports is reduced
results in benefits to the economy, and these are shared by labor and 
capital. Real compensation is increased by $209 billion and profits by
$142 billion. The increase in profits is much larger in percentage terms
(11.4 percent) than the increase in compensation (2.5 percent). Off-
shoring in this simulation thus shifts the distribution of income toward
capital. In this simulation the initial impact of offshoring is to increase
profits and displace labor. Over time, however, competition and higher
productivity result in lower prices, and that is what increases real com-
pensation. But higher profits are a persistent consequence of the ongoing
process of offshoring. It is not surprising to find that, if the U.S. econ-
omy becomes more exposed to low-cost labor, the result will be to shift
the distribution of income toward capital. Employees as a whole are bet-
ter off in this simulation, however.
Conclusion
We began by pointing to the large and sustained drop in payroll
employment that followed the end of the 1990s boom, and we presented a
variety of evidence to suggest that trade and offshoring were not major
reasons for this decline. The weakness in U.S. exports did contribute to
the job loss, however.
What, then, is the main explanation of the weakness in employment?
Charles Schultze has argued that the main cause is rapid productivity
growth.49 We agree that rapid productivity growth may be playing some
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damental cause.
In most textbooks an increase in productivity implies an outward shift
in the aggregate supply curve, resulting in lower prices and increased out-
put for any given aggregate demand schedule. There is no presumption
that employment will fall; indeed, to the extent that increased productivity
results in a higher marginal product of labor and wages are sticky, there
should be an increase in employment.
In addition, two previous shifts in the productivity trend in the postwar
U.S. economy provide evidence on how productivity affects aggregate
employment. In the 1970s a decline in productivity growth, combined
with the additional adverse supply shock of rising food and energy prices,
resulted in a sharp recession, with higher prices and much lower employ-
ment. In that episode slower productivity growth contributed to higher
inﬂation and to recession. In the second half of the 1990s, an acceleration
of productivity growth was followed by continued strong employment
growth and the lowest unemployment rate in a generation. The more rapid
growth of aggregate supply was more than balanced by growth in aggre-
gate demand. And, since faster productivity growth contributed to rising
real incomes and a rising stock market, the increased supply helped gen-
erate increased demand.
In sum, these two earlier instances of changes in the trend rate of pro-
ductivity growth (after 1973 and after 1995) do not support the hypothesis
that faster aggregate productivity growth causes lower employment. At
the least, the 1990s show that faster productivity growth does not auto-
matically generate weak employment.
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Table 14. Real Compensation of Employees and Corporate Proﬁts 
under Alternative Scenarios
Billions of 2000 dollars
Compensation Proﬁts
Difference Difference
Scenario Total from baseline Total from baseline
Baseline 8,458.2 0.0 1,247.5 0.0
Modeling offshoring as increase 
in services imports 8,298.7 -159.5 1,249.4 1.9
Modeling offshoring as reduction 
in services imports prices  8,667.4 209.2 1,389.2 141.7
Source: Authors’ simulations using the Macroeconomic Advisers’ model.
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meant that aggregate demand would have had to grow strongly in order to
maintain employment growth, and that did not occur. With strongly ex-
pansionary monetary and ﬁscal policies, the recession of 2001 was very
mild, and the employment drop was not unusual. The puzzle has been the
failure of demand and employment to recover strongly enough after 2001.
The reasons for this include the uncertainty resulting from 9/11 and the
war in Iraq, the direct effect of higher oil prices, the overhang from the
investment boom of the late 1990s, the weakness of the stock market
(only partly offset by the recovery in 2003), and, as we have emphasized,
the lagged impact of the strong dollar in the aftermath of the Asian ﬁnan-
cial crisis. The drop in U.S. capital goods investment, and notably the
decline in the demand for high-technology products, contributed to the
weakness of manufacturing employment. Monetary and ﬁscal policies,
although expansionary, were not powerful enough to offset these nega-
tives. Fiscal policy was more effective at increasing the budget deﬁcit
than at spurring demand. Monetary policy was about as expansionary as it
could be, and it certainly helped sustain demand for housing and automo-
biles. But history suggests that low interest rates can have a limited
impact on aggregate demand in the presence of business and consumer
uncertainty, especially given the lower bound on nominal interest rates.
We do not suggest that the U.S. economy is mired in perpetual job
weakness, however. The economy has repeatedly demonstrated its ability
to recover, and we expect aggregate demand and employment to increase
going forward, barring a new oil shock or major terrorist attack or other
calamity.
Since trade and offshoring were not the main reasons for the em-
ployment weakness, they should not be the focus of policies to restore
employment. Likewise, since imports were not the reason for the job loss,
there is not an employment case for trade restrictions to curtail imports.
Instead the best trade-related remedy for manufacturing employment 
is a lower value of the dollar and a sustained recovery of the world 
economy—outcomes that are desirable for other reasons as well. In the late
1990s, when domestic demand in the United States was booming, the
strong dollar helped relieve pressures on the U.S. labor market by reducing
exports and stimulating imports. It would certainly have been inadvisable
and inﬂationary for the United States to have reduced interest rates in an
effort to weaken the dollar in 1999 and 2000. However, once the economy
Martin Neil Baily and Robert Z. Lawrence 269
2581-03_Lawrence_rev.qxd  1/18/05  13:27  Page 269fell into a recession, the lagged impact of the strong dollar contributed to
labor market weakness.
U.S. policymakers have limited power to affect the exchange rate of
the dollar and the strength of the world economy. However, once the
overall recovery is well established, a sustained effort to reduce the fed-
eral budget deﬁcit would help lower interest rates and reduce the over-
valuation of the dollar—and would be good policy in any case. Policies
that might ameliorate the adverse effects of job reallocation caused by
trade include, in our judgment, trade adjustment assistance programs and
opportunities for workers to improve their skill levels.
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Frank Levy: About the time I received this paper, my wife and I had 
to drive our daughter to college. Because her room needed a floor lamp,
we ended up at IKEA. The reader can already see where this story is
heading. The floor lamp was nice, functional if not high style, and
adjustable in height up to about six feet. It was made in China and cost
$9.95. I informally sampled other IKEA items and found many had sim-
ilarly low prices.
I appreciate the distinction between anecdotes and data, but having just
seen these extremely low prices, I found this paper by Martin Baily and
Robert Lawrence quite timely. The paper draws four principal conclusions:
—The substantial loss of manufacturing jobs since 2000 was primar-
ily a function of weak aggregate domestic demand, not due to a flood of
imports.
—To the extent that trade did cause manufacturing job losses, it did so
through a sharp decline in exports. This decline can be largely explained
by the rise in the dollar, which undercut U.S. competitiveness.
—The outsourcing of service jobs was not particularly large in scale,
either in information technology services or in clerical back ofﬁce work.
—If, however, the Forrester Research predictions of future outsourcing
were to come true, the resulting job losses would be substantial. These job
losses would not pose a threat to full employment, but, under a variety of
assumptions, they would shift the composition of national income away
from wages and toward capital.
In this comment I will discuss ﬁrst the jobs data and then the paper’s
analysis of the data. I will end by summarizing what the reader should
take away from the paper.
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better understanding of exactly what jobs have been lost. This is at issue
because the well-known disagreements between the Current Population
Survey and the Employment Survey extend below the level of aggregate
employment to speciﬁc occupations. The two surveys agree, however, on
one central point: the loss of production jobs. The authors use the BLS’s
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES), which indicate that, between
the fourth quarter of 2000 and the second quarter of 2003, production
employment declined by 1.9 million. Similarly, Current Population Sur-
vey ﬁgures taken from the BLS website indicate that, between December
2000 and March 2003, production employment declined by about 1.9 mil-
lion. In other areas there is less agreement.
One potential disagreement, noted by the authors, is with respect to
managerial employment. The OES reports that, again over 2000:4–2003:2,
employment in “Management Occupations” fell by 1.1 million, or about
14 percent. This is a stunning figure for so short a time. The sum of
employment losses in this and a second category, business and ﬁnancial
operations occupations, is about 824,000, or about 7 percent of the aggre-
gated total. The CPS does not report data for managerial employment sep-
arately but rather reports data for the combined category “Management,
Business and Financial Operations Occupations,” and for the same period
it shows a gain of 458,000 jobs, or about 2 percent.
It is unclear what to make of this discrepancy, but it is worth noting that
employment in the CPS combined category is far larger than employment
in the two corresponding categories in the OES: roughly 19.6 million
workers versus 12.4 million, respectively, in 2000. As the authors note,
some of this difference in levels reﬂects the well-known bias in the house-
hold survey due to respondents’ tendency to inﬂate their occupational
titles. It is not clear, however, why self-reporting should bias the change in
these levels, turning a loss into a gain.
A second discrepancy arises in clerical employment (ofﬁce and admin-
istrative support). Here the difference, however, is one of magnitude rather
than sign: the OES shows a decline of about 250,000 workers from a base
of about 23 million, whereas the CPS shows a decline of about 1 million
from a base of about 20.5 million. Although in the end it may not be possi-
ble to resolve these differences, it is worth further effort to get a better
sense of how labor demand is tilting.
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turing employment is helpful, in particular the authors’ use of input-output
analysis to develop an accounting of how much of the decline is due to each
of various factors. Some points, however, require clariﬁcation. The ﬁrst is
the importance of productivity growth in job losses. As the authors explain,
when employment is considered, the important variable is not productivity
growth as such but rather the difference between the rate of productivity
growth and the rate of growth of demand. In this kind of comparison,
assigning importance to either variable requires external yardsticks. In
drawing their conclusions, the authors should be clearer about what yard-
sticks they are using. Early in the paper, they argue that rapid productivity
growth is not a primary cause of the manufacturing employment decline:
Some observers explain the recent job loss in manufacturing by pointing to the rel-
atively rapid manufacturing productivity growth of recent years, but between 2000
and 2003 this factor did not play a dominant role. Over that period the share of man-
ufacturing in nonfarm payrolls fell from 13.1 percent to 11.1 percent—a drop of 15
percent. But the 12 percent increase in nonfarm output per worker-hour between
2000 and 2003 was only 3 percentage points less than the increase in manufacturing
labor productivity. This leaves 80 percent (12 percentage points of the 15 percent)
of the decline in manufacturing employment’s share to be explained by other factors.
Ultimately, the authors conclude that the problem lies in the slow
growth of domestic demand for manufacturing output. In reaching this
conclusion, they describe productivity growth in manufacturing over
2000–03 as “remarkably rapid,” but they adopt what they call an alter-
native approach: “to see how domestic use and trade contributed to the
decline, taking productivity growth as given.” It is this alternative
approach that leads to their conclusion.
The reader needs ﬁrmer footing than this in order to understand what is
likely to happen to manufacturing jobs in the future. What rate of growth
of manufacturing demand would have been required to substantially
reduce job losses? What rate of GDP growth would have been required to
produce that growth in manufacturing demand? And how plausible would
such a rate of GDP growth have been? Because, as the authors say, man-
ufacturing productivity did not grow much faster than overall labor pro-
ductivity, the rate of GDP growth required to limit manufacturing job
losses may have been implausibly high. Fortunately, the simulations at the
end of the paper shed some light on these questions.
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The authors make a convincing case that the proximate cause of falling
exports was loss of international competitiveness—as opposed to, say,
slumping demand on the part of our trading partners. The reader wonders,
however, whether the loss of competitiveness was also driven by our trad-
ing partners switching to Chinese and Indian products: could cheap for-
eign products have harmed U.S. producers indirectly by outcompeting
them in export markets? The authors dismiss this possibility by saying
that China and India have been producing exports for a long time. A more
detailed look at the question would be welcome.
I found the authors’ discussion of services employment to be enlighten-
ing, but I would have liked more perspective on the numbers presented.
India is not the only country to which both software and business processing
services have been outsourced. As Richard Murnane and I were finish-
ing our book on computers, a General Electric appliance technician called
to apologize for a glitch in an appointment, saying that GE had just shifted
its call center work from India to Costa Rica. (It turned out that the appoint-
ment had been made by a software program.) If India was the main source
of growth in outsourcing during this period, then the focus on NASSCOM
data is reasonable. But some clariﬁcation on that point is needed.
The discussion of India provides a natural lead-in to my last question:
What should the reader take away from this paper? The paper does a very
good job at debunking certain assertions in the current debate, but, in this
case, debunking those claims is not equivalent to debunking what I see as
the underlying problem.
Much of the politics of import competition has centered on the job
prospects for less educated workers, often understood as those with no
more than a high school diploma. To be sure, software engineers who
have lost their jobs to outsourcing do not ﬁt this picture, and, on the other
hand, many people with only a high school diploma work in nontradable
crafts such as plumbing and carpentry. But, on balance, it is usually the
jobs of high school graduates—production workers, call center workers,
and others—that are the focus of the outsourcing and offshoring debate.
As the authors note at several points, this means that imports get the
blame both for the loss of U.S. jobs they actually cause and for those losses
that are in fact due to technological advance. And, as the authors also note,
these impacts of trade and technology do overlap to some degree. Murnane
and I have argued that tasks that can be adequately described in terms of
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amenable to computerization, but that the same tasks are also amenable
to moving offshore, because they can be explained with less risk of mis-
understanding.1 Thus one observes call center work being handled by con-
tinuous speech recognition or by Philippine operators reading from scripts;
basic tax preparation done by Indian accountants or by TurboTax; fabri-
cation done by robots in the United States or by foreign manufacturers
communicating with their U.S. customers through digital design protocols;
and so on.
The authors argue that a ﬂood of cheap imports should not be blamed
for the current problems in the market for high school graduates. With the
caveats already noted, that conclusion seems reasonable, but that is not to
say that the demand problems themselves are a ﬁction. To the contrary,
the rapid productivity growth in manufacturing that the authors cite, and the
examples they mention in the services sector, suggest that skill-biased tech-
nical change is not going away any time soon. They also suggest that 
the fear for which trade is a surrogate is correct—that many of the jobs
recently lost are not coming back, even in the long run. The authors’ sim-
ulations support this point and make the added point that a sharp increase
in labor supply—from both foreign labor and computers—will shift the
composition of national income away from labor and toward proﬁts.
Earlier this year, David Autor, Murnane, and I did a back-of-the-
envelope projection suggesting that, if the demand shift of the last thirty
years continues, half of the labor force in 2020 could have four years of
college, yet the college–high school wage premium would be no lower
than it is today.2 At the same time, we know from David Ellwood’s care-
ful work that, even under optimistic assumptions, no more than about 
35 percent of the labor force is likely to have that much education.3 In
the absence of speciﬁc policies to correct this imbalance, the share of the
work force receiving low wages is likely to increase, as too many work-
ers without college-level skills will be chasing too few jobs for which
they qualify.4 The projected combination of more jobs paying low wages
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1. Levy and Murnane (2004).
2. Autor, Murnane, and Levy (2004).
3. Ellwood (2001).
4. Or, as Gary Burtless (1990, p. 30) famously wrote, “Ironically, [less-skilled workers’]
labor market position could be improved if the U.S. economy produced more not fewer jobs
requiring limited skill.”
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ticularly illogical time to consider eliminating taxes on capital income
as a basis for tax reform.
In sum, the authors begin their paper the way economists love to begin,
with a quote from a noneconomist warning of catastrophe, whose claims
the paper then calmly but rigorously proceeds to dismantle. In this case
the silly noneconomist may have gotten some of his facts wrong: the labor
imbalances of which he speaks may owe more to technology than to trade,
and more to factors within countries than between them. But, ultimately,
Lou Dobbs may have more logic on his side than this paper admits.
Daniel E. Sichel: The coincidence of the sharp decline in manufacturing
employment in recent years and the growing current account deﬁcit has
led many in the media to posit a causal link from trade to the employment
dropoff. The outsourcing and offshoring of corporate operations, which
likewise have received extensive media coverage recently, also are often
cited as culprits behind recent job losses. This paper by Martin Baily and
Robert Lawrence tackles both of these issues. The ﬁrst part of the paper
lays out some basic facts about trade in recent years and provides a useful
analytical framework for assessing the impact of trade ﬂows on employ-
ment. The primary conclusion of this part of the paper is that trade was
not the principal cause of the employment drop in manufacturing from
2000 to 2003. The second part of the paper analyzes the effects of out-
sourcing and offshoring in recent years, with a focus on jobs lost to India.
This section concludes that these developments have had relatively mod-
est effects to date on U.S. employment.
I largely agree with the paper’s conclusions about the relatively small
role of trade in the recent manufacturing job loss and the relatively limited
effect of outsourcing and offshoring on employment. The empirical work
is well done, and the evidence on the role of trade is credible.
In the first part of the paper, however, I believe the authors are a bit
too quick to attribute the job loss to weak domestic demand. The endo-
geneity problem here is acute, and my sense is that rapid domestic pro-
ductivity growth played a larger role than the authors suggest.1 Recall that
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1. Schultze (2004) also argues that rapid productivity growth was an important part of
the job-loss story during this period.
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employment change at the detailed industry level into a weighted average
of the growth rate of value added less the growth rate of productivity for
each component of interest: exports, imports, and domestic demand (equa-
tion 5 in the paper).2 This industry-level decomposition is then aggregated
to track the effects of trade on employment growth. Using this decompo-
sition, the authors ﬁnd that, of the 950,000 net manufacturing jobs lost per
year between 2000 and 2003, only about 105,000 can be attributed to
trade, with the remainder, about 845,000, attributable to weak domestic
demand.
In this decomposition, productivity growth is taken as given and the
domestic demand term is calculated as a residual. Thus, although this
decomposition tells us something about the role of trade, it does not cut
the knot of endogeneity and fully disentangle what else is going on. In
particular, because productivity growth is taken as given, the decomposi-
tion can assign no role to productivity growth as a source of job loss.
Baily and Lawrence clearly understand the endogeneity problem and
point it out several times in the paper. Nevertheless, the reader is still
left wondering what shock kicked off the large manufacturing decline.
The phrase “weak domestic demand” has the flavor of a business cycle
shock, but the recession of 2001 was quite mild by historical standards.
Of course, the recession in manufacturing was quite severe, but noting
that fact just begs the question of why it was so severe—was the under-
lying cause the implosion of the technology sector, the overhang of cap-
ital goods from the late 1990s, other sources of weak domestic demand,
or rapid productivity growth?
One could argue that the main point of this part of the paper—that trade
did not account for much of the employment decline in manufacturing—
does not depend on identifying what other factors did cause the decline.
However, I would argue that identifying those factors—whether it was
weak domestic demand, rapid productivity growth, or some combination
of the two—would make more credible the authors’ argument that trade
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2. The decomposition linking employment and trade is built up at a detailed level using
the 1997 input-output tables. Implicitly, using these tables to assess trade ﬂows from 2000 to
2003 assumes that intersectoral relationships have not changed since 1997. The fact that the
1997 table is the most recent available at a sufﬁciently disaggregated level highlights the
need for the statistical agencies to produce input-output tables more quickly.
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facturing employment decline was not caused by trade might be easier if
the primary explanation were not a factor calculated as a residual. Hence
I will explore the productivity issue a bit further.
For the economy as a whole, rapid productivity growth is seen by
many analysts as closely linked to the jobless recovery.4 This observa-
tion is suggestive, and an alternative decomposition of the employment
loss in manufacturing would assign a larger role to productivity growth.
Of course, such a decomposition also would be subject to endogeneity
issues, but it highlights that different conditioning assumptions could
lead to different conclusions. Here are some pieces that could go into an
alternative decomposition.
Consider the pickup in manufacturing productivity growth after 2001.
Productivity growth in manufacturing averaged 3
3⁄4 percent a year from
1995 to 2001 but then picked up to an average annual pace of 6 percent
from 2001 to 2003. Consider the counterfactual in which manufactur-
ing productivity increased 3
3⁄4 percent a year from 2001 to 2003 rather than
6 percent. Then, taking output growth as given, manufacturing em-
ployment would have declined by about 340,000 less per year. Of course,
in this counterfactual the workweek might have increased, and so the em-
ployment effect might have been less than 340,000, but since this analy-
sis is only meant to be illustrative, I will stick with a ﬁgure of 340,000 jobs
a year to keep things simple.
Over and above the job losses stemming from this burst of productivity,
manufacturing employment has been experiencing longer-term decline.
Between the peaks in manufacturing employment in 1989 and 1998, man-
ufacturing employment declined by an average of about 50,000 a year. If
this trend rate of decline has continued in recent years, manufacturing
employment would have been declining by 50,000 a year during 2000–03,
all else equal.
Consider as well the decline in technology sector employment related
to the collapse of that sector and an overhang of high-technology capital
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3. It is also possible that the shock was neither weak domestic demand nor productiv-
ity, but a third factor that caused both the productivity and employment outcomes. For
example, greater-than-usual business caution could have led to sluggish employment
growth and rapid productivity gains as ﬁrms pushed current employees harder.
4. For example, see Gordon (2003) and the discussions of that paper by Martin Baily
and myself.
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electronic products declined by about 175,000 a year during 2000–03.
Putting these pieces together (using the authors’ estimate of the trade
effect and of the employment decline in the high-technology sector), this
illustrative alternative decomposition would parse the employment decline
of 950,000 a year as shown in the ﬁrst column below:
Alternative Baily and
decomposition Lawrence
Total job loss during 2000–03 (annual average) 950,000 950,000
Due to:
Trade 105,000 105,000
Faster manufacturing productivity growth 340,000
Trend decline in manufacturing employment 50,000
Collapse of the technology sector 175,000
Other (including decline in domestic demand) 280,000 846,000
In this alternative decomposition, productivity-related factors (the third
and fourth lines) together account for 390,000 of the yearly decline in
manufacturing jobs, and the technology sector collapse for another
175,000. Taking account of these pieces leaves just 280,000 for the “other”
category, compared with a residual of 846,000 (with rounding) in the
Baily-Lawrence decomposition. The point of this exercise is not to say that
the alternative decomposition is correct, but rather that alternative assump-
tions about what should be taken as given can lead to different conclusions
about the source of the employment decline.
In considering whether productivity growth is a plausible explanation
for the employment decline, it is important to distinguish between short-
run and long-run effects of changes in aggregate productivity growth. The
authors point out in their conclusion that the slowdown in productivity
growth in the mid-1970s was associated with weak employment growth,
whereas the productivity pickup of the second half of the 1990s was asso-
ciated with strong employment growth. These patterns—which are related
to long-lived changes in the underlying trend of productivity—suggest that
changes in aggregate trend productivity growth are, if anything, positively
associated with employment change.5 However, there are plenty of exam-
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opposed to that in the economy as a whole, it is also necessary to delve into the relative
rates of productivity growth across sectors and the elasticities of demand in different sec-
tors. See Economic Report of the President, 2004, pp. 60–71, for a discussion.
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strong aggregate productivity growth appears to be associated with weak
employment growth. Indeed, in the early 1990s, a time of another jobless
recovery, just such a thing happened. Decades earlier, in the early 1950s
and again in the early 1960s, productivity growth was relatively rapid
while employment growth was relatively sluggish.6
The analysis of outsourcing and offshoring in the second part of the
paper is particularly valuable, because it debunks a lot of hype around
these issues in the press. The data for this analysis are relatively sparse,
and the concepts are less well defined than in the first part of the paper,
inevitably making the analysis a little softer and squishier. Nevertheless,
the authors present credible evidence that outsourcing and offshoring
have not, to date, been major factors behind employment loss in the U.S.
economy. I quite liked the simulations done with the Macroeconomic
Advisers model. Although such simulations are not often included in
academic papers, and despite possible arguments related to the Lucas cri-
tique, I believe these simulations provide useful insights into how (and
how much) outsourcing and offshoring might plausibly affect employ-
ment going forward.
In addition, I commend the authors for their discussion of the quality
(or productivity) of outsourced or offshored services relative to that of
domestic employees. Many analysts seem to skip very lightly over this
issue (implicitly assuming that the two groups of workers are of identical
quality), even though it is an important link in sorting through the impli-
cations of outsourcing and offshoring.
Finally, although the authors focus primarily on net job loss, I sus-
pect that, for the public at large, gross job loss is a more salient metric. I
also suspect that any wage loss associated with trade or outsourcing or
offshoring is a matter of great concern to many in the labor force, as is
any trade-linked uncertainty about employment or wage prospects. The
authors are careful to mention that losses to individuals can be large, even
if the net employment effect for the economy as a whole is small. Never-
theless, given the current economic and policy environment, I suspect
that the public and the political world will largely continue to focus on
issues that go well beyond net job loss.
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6. These observations are based on three-year moving averages of productivity and
employment growth.
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in U.S. exports and how to interpret it. Edmund Phelps observed that U.S.
ﬁrms moving operations offshore is an important part of the story, and that
much of the offshoring of production to China is aimed at the Chinese
rather than the U.S. consumer. Together with the strengthening dollar over
much of the period in question, this offshoring worsens the U.S. terms of
trade and the competitiveness of U.S. exports produced by U.S. labor and
other U.S. inputs. This contrasts with the worrisome increase in supplies of
imports, which improve our terms of trade. Susan Collins reported that BEA
data on the overseas activities of U.S.-owned multinational corporations
abroad showed that 75 percent of their output is sold in the host market, with
an additional 12 percent sold in third markets, and only about 12 percent
exported to the United States. This suggests that most of the increased activ-
ity abroad is reﬂected in lower exports rather than higher imports. She
noted that the paper’s macroeconomic model simulations treat shocks as a
fall in import prices, with positive effects for the United States through
improvement in the terms of trade. She reasoned that it would be more
accurate to model the shocks as a reduction in the prices at which the
United States can export, which would indicate a deterioration in the terms
of trade as Phelps suggested. Collins added that it would be useful to distin-
guish clearly between outsourcing and offshoring. Outsourcing refers to jobs
that are moved organizationally, from one ownership structure to a differ-
ent one. Offshoring refers to moving jobs or activities from the home coun-
try to another country, within the same organizational structure. Austan
Goolsbee added that the employment ﬁgures for manufacturing are likely
to be distorted by the growing practice of outsourcing. The Census Bureau
has not been able to identify when ﬁrms in manufacturing and elsewhere
have terminated employees and rehired them or similar workers to do the
same jobs under temporary contracts or through employment services.
William Nordhaus questioned the authors’ treatment of productivity in
the manufacturing sector, which implies that higher productivity will lead
to proportionally lower employment. With manufacturing so open to for-
eign competition, the demand elasticity is likely to be high enough that
increased productivity would lead to more jobs rather than less. He also
questioned the assumption of a one-for-one job transfer from the United
States to India, which the authors conceded provides only an upper limit
for actual job loss. He noted that applying the job-for-job methodology to
Chinese exports to the United States might show that tens of millions of
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suggested that the job-for-job calculation be compared with a dollar-for-
dollar calculation converted to U.S. employment, which could provide a
lower limit for U.S. job loss. Nordhaus also criticized the paper’s use of
the Forrester data as a baseline for longer-term projections, on the grounds
that doing so gives them much greater credibility than they deserve.
Richard Cooper remarked that the public debate to which this paper
contributes has been going on since 1820, yet little has been resolved,
because economists use a general equilibrium framework whereas the pub-
lic thinks in partial equilibrium or anecdotal terms. In addressing the
public concerns in the first part of the paper, the authors use a partial
equilibrium framework, taking macroeconomic developments such as
exchange rate changes as givens. Yet the dollar was strong in part because
of very extensive foreign investment in the United States, some of which
was employment-creating. Thus the employment consequences of open-
ness are quite different if one focuses broadly on U.S. engagement with the
world economy rather than only on U.S. trade in manufactured goods.
Cooper also regarded the baseline simulation, under which the U.S.
current account deficit falls to $100 billion in 2015 with substantial dol-
lar depreciation, as unrealistic. He reasoned that the shock to the world
economy, in particular the Japanese and European economies, from such a
change in current account balances and exchange rates would be too
large to tolerate. A baseline with a U.S. current account deficit in 2015
of $400 billion rather than $100 billion would be more realistic.
John Leahy observed that the paper’s focus on job losses missed what
might be the even greater public concern over incomes, particularly toward
the lower end of the wage distribution. Over the longer run, unemployment
is trendless, and little joblessness is permanent, whether initiated by trade
or other developments. However, the effects of trade competition on prices
and wages, which the authors do not address, are a different matter. He
argued that what workers fear is competing against low-wage foreign
workers and ultimately having to accept low wages themselves. Thus what
trade will do to the wage distribution, particularly at the low end, is the rel-
evant issue in the debate. Adam Posen added that the standard remedy,
compensating those workers who lose their jobs to trade, does not fully
address the political economy pressures raised by trade. Workers feel that
their bargaining power and status are threatened, and income transfers do
not overcome their risk aversion and sense of entitlement.
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